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THE LEGALIZATION AND CONTROL OF
CASINO GAMBLING
L Nelson Rose*
I. Introduction
Legalized gambling is spreading once again across the United
States.' It is, in fact, "one of.the fastest growing industries in the
world." ' When the Final Report of the Commission on the Review
of the National Policy Toward Gambling (National Gambling
Commission)3 was completed in 1976, legalized gambling was avail-
* Member, American Bar Association, Hawaii Bar Association. B.A. 1973, University of
California at Los Angeles. J.D. 1979, Harvard Law School. The author is associated with the
firm of Hoddick, Reinwald, O'Connor & Marrack, Honolulu, Hawaii.
1. This is apparently the third wave of legalized gambling to sweep the nation, beginning
in earnest in 1964 when New Hampshire became the first state in this century to authorize a
lottery. The first wave lasted from colonial times to the Civil War and was characterized by
the use of both publicly and privately sponsored lotteries. For example, during currency
shortages individuals, unable to find buyers for real property or merchandise, resorted to
lotteries as a means of raising money and disposing of their goods. Governmental entities sold
lottery tickets to finance military operations and public works. Around the turn of the nine-
teenth century, many states banned private lotteries and by the Civil War anti-lottery forces
had succeeded in abolishing lotteries in every state except Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri.
D. WEINSTEIN & L. DEITCH, THE IMPACT OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING 8-9 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as WEINSTEIN]. The financial predicament of many southern states brought about the second
wave shortly after the Civil War. The most infamous lottery of this time was the "Louisiana
Lottery" which was operated in New Orleans by a New York gambling syndicate and pene-
trated every state of the nation despite anti-lottery laws. Opponents of the Louisiana Lottery
pressured Congress to eliminate lotteries. However, it was not until 1890 that their efforts
succeeded. In that year, Congress passed legislation giving the Postmaster General the power
to refuse delivery of lottery-related mail. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, §1, 26 Stat. 465. See
Blakey & Kurland, The Development of The Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV.
923 (1978). See also H. CHAFETZ, PLAY THE DEVIL (1960); R; KING, GAMBLING AND ORGANIZED
CRIME (1969) [hereinafter cited as KING]; COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL
POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN AMERICA (1976) [hereinafter cited as GAMBLING IN
AMERICA]; Fact Research Inc., Gambling in Perspective: A Review of the Written History
of Gambling and an Assessment of its Effect on Modern American Society in GAMBLING IN
AMERICA, supra, app. 1, at 1.
2. Long Beach Woos Panel on Casinos, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 21 (Long Island
Weekly), at 1, col. 4 (statement of Humberto Betancourt, official in charge of creating the
commission to license and regulate all forms of gambling in Puerto Rico); see also OTB Fails
to Meet Revenue Goal and to Reduce Illegal Bookmaking, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1979, at Al,
col. 2.
3. The Commission was created by Congress in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 804-809, 84 Stat. 922.
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able in various forms in thirty-two states. 4 Furthermore, almost
every sign points to a continued expansion of legal gambling. In a
very short time state operated lotteries have become an accepted
institution.' By 1978, fourteen states had operating lotteries and ten
more were considering legalization.' Pari-mutuel on-site betting has
been established for over forty years and has lost most of its oppor-
brious character.7 Currently, thirty states permit on-track betting at
horseraces and at least seven others are considering it.' The contro-
versy surrounding the legalization of off-track betting, like that sur-
rounding dog racing and jai alai, has revolved more around protect-
ing the investments and special interests of the entrenched horse-
race track industry rather than around any arguments of morality
or corruption.? As of 1976, two states had off-track betting and at
least seven more were debating its implementation.'" Moreover,
gambling reform is uniformly in the direction of legalization. It is
extremely rare to find a state rescinding its decision to decriminalize
gambling games.".
In this context the support for legalizing casino gambling is not
surprising." The temptation to legalize casino gambling is great. In
4. Helsing, Gambling-The Issues and Policy Decisions Involved in the Trend Toward
Legalization-A Statement of the Current Anachronism of Benign Prohibition in GAMBLING
IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 1, at 775 [hereinafter cited as Helsing].
5. Id. at 775. See also A. SPOFFORD, LOTTERIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY, S. Misc. Doc. No.
57, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. 174-75 (1893) (cited in Blakey & Kurland, supra note 1, at 927):
For many years after [the lottery] began to prevail it was not regarded at all as a kind
of gambling; the most reputable citizens were engaged in these lotteries, either as
selected managers or as liberal subscribers. It was looked upon as a kind of voluntary
tax for paving streets, erecting wharves, buildings, etc., with a contingent profitable
return for such subscribers as held the lucky numbers.
6. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1978-79 at 73 (1978).
7. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 105.
8. Helsing, supra note 4, at 775.
9. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 134.
10. Helsing, supra note 4, at 775.
11. Apparently no state in this century has made illegal a gambling game once it has been
decriminalized, other than a few short-lived experiments with slot machines and Nevada's
on-again, off-again decriminalization of casinos between 1900 and eventual legalization in
1931. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAW OF GAMBLING: 1776-1976 (1977) [hereinafter cited as THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF
GAMBLING].
12. Summaries of Hearing Testimony Before the Commission on the Review of the Na-
tional Policy Towards Gambling in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 3, at 65-127
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
19801 CASINO GAMBLING 247
1978, Nevada received over $80 million on casino taxable revenue
of $1.5 billion.' Similarly, in New Jersey'4 the Resorts International
casino hotel in Atlantic City grossed $220 million in its first year of
operation.'" The average daily gross is about $800,000; on one day
the casino grossed a record $1.25 million." Since Caeser's Boardwalk
Regency Hotel opened on June 26, 1979, reported winnings averaged
almost $450,000 a day. New Jersey officials expect the state to
realize $45.6 million in fiscal year 1979-80's from the casino gam-
bling tax.'9 Additionally, new hotel construction and renovation has
13. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1979, at A25, col. 1.
14. In 1976, the New Jersey State Legislature passed an amendment to the state constitu-
tion authorizing casino gambling in Atlantic City and pledging any revenues derived from
the state tax to particular sources. N.J. CONST. art. 4, §7, 2 reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be lawful for the Legislature to authorize by law the establishment and opera-
tion, under regulation and control by the State, of gambling houses or casinos within
the boundaries . . . of the city of Atlantic City, and to license and tax such operations
and equipment used in connection therewith. . . .State revenues derived therefrom
[are] to be applied solely for the purpose of providing reduction in property taxes,
rentals, telephone, gas, electric, and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citi-
zens and disabled residents of the State, in accordance with such formulae as the
Legislature shall by law provide. The type and number of such casinos or gambling
houses and of the gambling games which may be conducted in any such establishment
shall be determined by or pursuant to the terms of the law authorizing the establish-
ment and operation thereof.
After New Jersey citizens approved the constitutional amendment, the legislature passed
enabling legislation in 1977 which provided for extensive state regulation and control of casino
gambling. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 12 (West Supp. 1979). For a discussion of New Jersey's
control legislation, see pt. IV (B) infra.
15. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1979, at B1, col. 2. Resorts International opened the first Atlantic
City casino in May, 1978. Ceasars World opened the Boardwalk Regency Hotel and Casino
in June, 1979. The Bally Manufacturing Corporation has recently received an operating
certificate to open a third casino, the Park Place, in Atlantic City. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1979,
at B2, col. 3. See note 260 infra and accompanying text.
16. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1979, at B1, col. 6.
17. Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1979, at 34, col. 1.
18. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1979, at B2, col. 5. Experience teaches that official predictions
of potential gambling revenue are overstated. For example, New York State lottery officials
predicted that the state lottery would generate $360 million for state schools in its first year
of operation. However, the schools received only $62.4 million. New Hampshire has been
similarly disappointed with the proceeds of its lottery. See Rosen, The Economics of State-
Operated Lotteries in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 1, at 805, 808 [hereinafter
cited as Rosen].
19. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-139 (West Supp. 1979). The New Jersey Legislature has re-
cently passed legislation temporarily increasing the tax on gambling casino profits from eight
percent to twelve percent when two or three casinos are licensed and in operation, ten percent
when four or five casinos are licensed and in operation and.eight percent when six or more
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dramatically increased. 0
The success of the Atlantic City casino operation has intensified
efforts to legalize casino gambling in neighboring states, especially
in New York.2' Agencies charged with enforcing gambling codes,
from the Gaming Control Board in Nevada to the Mayor's office in
New York City, have devoted considerable attention to the potential
economic and social impact of legalized casino gambling on their
jurisdictions.2 This Article will discuss the reasons behind the
spread and escalation of legalized gambling and will argue that this
movement is inevitable, at least for the next few decades. The un-
casinos are licensed and in operation. Should the third casino not be operating by April 1,
1980, the tax rate for the two existing casinos will be fourteen percent until the third casino
begins operation. 1979 N.J. Laws ch. 198.
20. Atlantic County officials estimated that current and planned development would
surpass $1 billion. "The talk is of an Atlantic City free of urban decay, free of recurring money
shortages, free of welfare rolls, with a Las Vegas Strip along the Boardwalk providing the basis
for an economy of full employment and municipal surpluses." N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1979, at
B1, col. 3. Angelos C. Demetriou, the city planner hired to develop Atlantic City's master
plan, sees the Atlantic City of the future as a "frontier of modernity," in which "masterful
architecture, approved by an aesthetic review board, will provide an 'uplifted look, an
uplifted feeling.'" Id. Resorts International, Inc., which opened the first legalizeR gambling
casino in New Jersey in May, 1978, recently announced that it would spend more than $120
million to build another larger Boardwalk casino and 1,000-room hotel. Id., July 27, 1979, at
B1, col. 6. On December 31, 1979 four major hotel companies announced plans to open a
casino strip in an undeveloped wasteland seventeen blocks from the Boardwalk strip on which
Resorts, Ceasars World and Park Place are situated. Four Concerns in Atlantic City Plan
Major Casino Complex, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1980, at B2, col. 1.
21. The legalization of casino gambling in New York requires an amendment to art. 1, §
9, of the state constitution which presently prohibits most forms of gambling. Article 19, § 1,
of the constitution details the procedure by which constitutional amendments may be initi-
ated by the state legislature. A proposed amendment must be passed by a majority of the
members of each house. If the proposal is passed in both houses, it is referred to the next
regular legislative session convening after the succeeding general election of the Assembly.
Once the proposed amendment is twice approved in two successive legislative sessions, it is
submitted to the people for final approval. N.Y. CONST. art. 19. In 1978, the New York State
Legislature passed three proposals for the legalization of casino gambling. N.Y.S. 10465-A,
10467-A, 10468-A, 201st Sess. (1978). However, the state legislature did not pass any of these
bills in 1979. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1979, at B3, col. 1. Consequently, the amendment
process must be repeated, delaying legalization until 1981 at the earliest.
22. " 'Once gambling is legalized,' said the official-Gordon Haesloop, deputy coordinator
for criminal justice in the Mayor's [New York] office-with the state taking an interest in
it, 'we'd have to reevaluate our law-enforcement policy regarding illegal casinos.'" N.Y.
Times, March 27, 1979, at B1, col. 1. Nevada has a special interest in Atlantic City casinos
not only for the economic reasons of potential competition, but also due to the statutory
mandate to investigate "foreign" gaming by Nevada licensees. NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 463.680
to 463.720 (1977).
CASINO GAMBLING
derlying theme of this Article is control; the control that must be
exercised not only for legal casinos to fulfill any of their stated
purposes, but also to prevent the creation of new problems more
serious than those casinos are designed to solve. Four models of
control for legal casinos will be studied: Nevada'stfree enterprise
model, New Jersey's and Puerto Rico's tourist area revitalization
model, England's strict social control model, and the model of com-
plete or partial state ownership. The effectiveness of these different
models in meeting the requirements of control will be analyzed both
in their theoretical structures and as they operate in practice.
II. The Present System: "Benign Prohibition"3
Many forms of gambling flourish within the typical East Coast
state. Some forms are legal and actively promoted, while others are
illegal but tolerated. 4 This jurisdiction has a state-operated lot-
tery requiring constant advertising and legalized with the promise
of diverting large sums of money from the illegal "numbers" 5
rackets into the state coffers. The numbers games, however, re-
mains and the revenue from the lottery has been disappointing. An
old established horseracing industry enables players to place pari-
mutuel bets at the tracks. There have been occasional scandals,
but the major discussion among horsemen has been the declining
patronage and perceived competition from neighboring states,
particularly a nearby state's off-track betting operation. There is
considerable interest in instituting an off-track betting operation
23. This phrase was apparently coined by Patricia Helsing. See Helsing, supra note 4, at
773.
24. Much of this picture is drawn from conclusions of the National Gambling Commis-
sion. See generally GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1.
25. The "numbers" game has been described as follows:
In many New York neighborhoods, there are spots every block or two, in candy
stores, tobacco stores, unadorned storefronts and first floor apartments where one can
place a 25¢, 50 or $1 bet on a number. Various kinds of bets may be placed on one to
three digits. The winning number each day is determined by a complicated formula
based on the amounts of money wagered and paid out at various racetracks. In essence,
the numbers game is a lottery, with odds ranging from 10-1 to 1000-1, depending on
whether one bets on one, two or three digits. The payoff ranges from 6-1 to 600-1, with
the game's sponsors keeping forty percent of the amount bet to cover their operating
expenses and profits.
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE CITY'S ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES, COMMISSION REPORT 78 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KNAPP COMMIS-
SION REPORT]. See also KING, supra note 1, at 56.
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within this jurisdiction, but the track owners want a guaranteed
percentage from the state to cover any loss in attendance. In addi-
tion, the attention drawn to the Atlantic City experience has
created pressure from the local tourist-dependent industry to
legalize casinos. Some urban legislators see casinos as a unique tool
for redeveloping the inner city.
Other legal forms of gambling abound, although generally not
recognized as such. For example, bingo, or one of its variations, is
sponsored for charity and a considerable industry has developed
around regularly scheduled bingo games. Commercial contests and
sweepstakes are accepted as ordinary business practices.
The piecemeal expansion of legalized gambling has been accom-
panied by a relaxed enforcement of those statutory prohibitions still
in effect.2" The few arrests that are made almost always result in
dismissals, findings of not guilty, or the imposition of minor fines.27
This is not a sign that illegal gambling has died out; on the contrary,
it flourishes. Bookies do a large business in illegal bets on single
sports events. Numbers, card and dice games flourish to a lesser
extent. Additionally, it is claimed that about twenty percent of the
population violates the law every year even though limiting their
gambling to social bets between friends." The imposition of mini-
mal legal sanctions on the operation of illegal games has been la-
beled "benign prohibition. ' 2 Benign prohibition is an unofficial
policy adopted in jurisdictions where law enforcement agencies
lack the resources to conduct thorough investigations of low-priority
crimes. Gambling-related police corruption is frequently a part of
26. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 35. See also Hidden Casinos Run Nightly in
New York, N.Y. Times, March 26, 1979, at Al, col. 1; Reuter, Enforceability of Gambling
Laws in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 1, at 557 [hereinafter cited as Reuter]. For
a discussion of the changing laws on social gambling see Seitzinger, Gambling, 28 MAINE L.
REV. 37, 44 (1976). "The laws against social gambling in private are primarily a symbolic
gesture on the part of the legislators; they are neither enforced nor enforceable in any reasona-
ble sense of the word." F. FOWLER, T. MANGIONE & F. PRATTER, GAMBLING LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN MAJOR AMERICAN CITIES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iv (1978) (study for the National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
United States Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as GAMBLING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
MAJOR AMERICAN CITIES].
27. Riedel & Thornberry, The Effect of Increased Enforcement of Gambling Laws in
GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 1, at 494 [hereinafter cited as Reidell.
28. Kallick, Suits, Dielman & Hybels, Survey of American Gambling Attitudes and
Behavior in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 2, at 12-15 [hereinafter cited as
Kallick].
29. Helsing, supra note 4.
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this system and contributes to the widely held belief that gambling
laws are unenforceable. Consequently, violations of gambling laws
are often ignored, gambling convictions are rare and penalties light.
Thus, the typical eastern state contains two parallel, marginally
competitive gambling markets: an area of expanding legal gambling
enterprises and a flourishing illegal gambling trade that law enforce-
ment officials, prosecutors, judges and the public are either unable
or unwilling to eradicate. 0
The effects of benign prohibition, particularly corruption, result
from the uncontrolled discretion given police and prosecutors.31
Officially the officers are supposed to enforce the law against all
those who break it. Yet an officer doing exactly that would not
receive support from the department, the public or the judicial sys-
tem.2 A patrolman will not make gambling arrests if not pressured
to do so. The arrests require great efforts to meet evidentiary re-
quirements while observing constitutional rights.33 One result is
that officers realize that gambling arrests are considered unim-
portant.3 ' Thus, the value of the statutory scheme becomes less
sacrosanct. The police, however, do not want to gain a reputation
of being indifferent to law-breakers. Often a compromise of selec-
30. Id. at 777-78.
31. "A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him
free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction." K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4 (1976). This definition includes the
options by the officer of committing illegal acts or ignoring the illegal acts of others. For a
general discussion of the problems of discretion in the criminal justice field see Vorenberg,
Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L. J. 651.
32. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 35.
33. The difficulty of gambling law enforcement is well known to law enforcement
officers but is less commonly appreciated by the general public. Most citizens believe
that illegal gambling is associated with police corruption. They are generally unaware
of the legal technicalities and investigative difficulties which constrain gambling law
enforcement. In many cities, public social gambling is prevalent enough to make
enforcement against it an endless task. The arrest of bookmakers and numbers opera-
tors, on the other hand, requires lengthy investigations which often include extensive
physical surveillance-still the most common investigative procedure used in gam-
bling law enforcement. Unless considerable care is taken when gathering evidence
against a commercial operator, the arrest will be fruitless because the case will not hold
up in court. The majority of all police officers recognize this fact; 73 percent agreed
that it is often impossible to make a good case against a known street-level operator.
GAMBLING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 26, at 27.
34. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 48. The low priority given to gambling offenses
1980]
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tive enforcement and quotas is worked out." It is easy for an officer
in this situation to fall into venality and corruption." Gambling
operators are dependent on the police for the continued survival of
their enterprise and will take advantage of every opportunity to
ensure noninterference. 7 The effects of benign prohibition on the
general public are equally deleterious. Because the law has been
voided through the enforcement process rather than changed
through legislation, public confidence in law enforcement officials
has eroded."
reflects .the low priority giqen to such offenses by the public. Table 1 below shows the relative
ranking by police departments of public support for arrests and investigations for various
types of offenses.
TABLE 1
Average Rating of Citizen Support for Enforcement
(l=poor, 2=fair, 3-good, 4=very good, 5=excellent)
Robbery 3.9
Narcotics sale/distribution 3.7
After hours liquor sale 2.4
Organized card and dice games 2.1
Bookmaking operation 2.0
Numbers, policy operation 1.8
Pratter & Fowler, Police Peceptions about Gambling Enforcement: A National Survey of Law
Enforcement Agencies in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 1, at 461, 480. See
also Mangione, Fowler, Pratter & Martin, Citizen Views of Gambling Enforcement in
GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 1, at 240, 242.
35. Rubinstein, Gambling Enforcement and Police Corruption in GAMBLING IN AMERICA,
supra note 1, app. 1 at 600, 611 [hereinafter cited as Rubinstein].
36. Money is the main incentive for venality. It is unclear exactly how much money is
bet illegally each year, how much is siphoned off into organized crime and how much finds
its way into the hands of officials in the form of bribes. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1,
at 63-65. The low range estimates are in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Kretz
& Duncan, Police Attitudes Toward Gambling in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app.
1, at 574. Whatever the total, the amount given to an officer can be substantial. The Knapp
Commission found that "[plarticipation in organized payoffs-a pad-netted individual
officers monthly amounts ranging from $300 to $1500. In return for protection from enforce-
ment (except for occasional token arrests) gambling establishments paid as much as $3,500
a month." GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 40. See also Reuter, supra note 26 at 551;
Duncan, Gambling-Related Corruption in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, app. 1, at 574 [hereinafter
cited as Duncan]; Rubenstein, supra note 35, at 600.
37. Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 611. "A successful illegal gambling enterprise, unlike
any other criminal business, requires a freedom to operate in a routinized, scheduled fash-
ion." Id. at 600.
38. Duncan, supra note 36, at 587. The public also plays an important role in creating
the moral context in which the laws are to be enforced. It has been noted that a double
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One solution to the problem of uncontrolled discretion and result-
ing corruption was offered by the Knapp Commission: 31 patrol offi-
cers were not to enforce the laws against gambling, thereby taking
discretion entirely out of the hands of the police and court system. 0
Such a policy, however, would only contribute to the proliferation
of illegal gambling. Eventually, the public would not tolerate wide-
open gambling, thus forcing the reimposition of controls.' Another
possible solution includes focusing on police or prosecutorial discre-
tion through greater accountability, improved articulation of poli-
cies and practices, increased salary and incentives, better recruit-
ment, better training and more vigorous investigations and prosecu-
tions. A third solution calls for the legalization of gambling.42
III. The Problems of Legalized Gambling
Arguments on both sides of the legalized gambling question tend
to be more anecdotal than logical. Proponents claim almost instan-
taneous cures for many of society's problems while opponents pre-
dict society's downfall, usually in moralistic terms.4 3
standard of morality exists in dealing with gambling, prostitution, liquor and similar matters:
there is a desire to outlaw in the abstract but not to enforce strictly. See Peterson, Obstacles
to Enforcement of Gambling Laws, 259 ANNALS 10,19 (1950); Bloch, Gambling Business: An
American Paradox, 8 CRIM. & DELIQUENCY 355 (1962). Gunnar Myrdal has described the
effects of individual morality on enforcement of the laws in America. A person feels free to
violate the law if the law has become disputable on moral grounds and the particular act
involved does not violate the individual's concept of morality. This attitude would naturally
strengthen the rule of law when a statute prohibits conduct which is generally regarded as
immoral, but breeds disrespect when the act forbidden is not considered a violation of the
inner moral code. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 15 (1944).
39. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City's Anti-
Corruption Procedures (commonly referred to as the Knapp Commission) was established in
May, 1970 by Executive Order of Mayor Lindsay. The Knapp Commission was given the
"basic tasks of determining the extent and nature of police corruption in the City, examining
existing procedures for dealing with corruption, and recommending changes and improve-
ments in those procedures." Preface to KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 (1972).
40. 'The criminal laws against gambling should be repealed. To the extent that the
legislature deems that some control over gambling is appropriate, such regulation
should be a civil rather than criminal process. The police should in any event be
relieved from any responsibility for the enforcement of gambling laws or regulations.
KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 18.
41. Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 627.
42. Duncan, supra note 36, at 588.
43. Typical of those comments made by opponents of legalized gambling is one by State
Representative John Monks of Oklahoma: "In every country the Communists have taken
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Foremost among the arguments offered by proponents of legalized
gambling is that the prohibition of gambling is unenforceable." Sev-
eral reasons are offered to explain the unenforceability of gambling
laws. These include the high cost of enforcement and the difficulty
in fulfilling evidentiary requirements, the public's general accept-
ance of gambling, organized crime's power within the political and
judicial system, the inability to deter operators and bettors by the
threat of severe punishment, and, as a consequence of all of these
factors, the low priority given to enforcement by police officials.'"
These arguments, however, tend to assume a conclusion. "As laws
against certain kinds of offenses are no longer enforced, there is an
increasing tendency to act as though those laws are unenforcea-
ble.""6
An experiment conducted by Chief Justice Weintraub of the New
Jersey Supreme Court has shown that gambling laws can be en-
forced. Beginning in 1960, with State v. Ivan,'7 Chief Justice Wein-
traub took a number of steps to encourage the stringent enforcement
of the gambling laws in New Jersey through changes at the judicial
level. The hope was that gambling cases would become "good" ar-
rests and "good" convictions on the records of police officers and
prosecutors. In Ivan, the court sustained a relatively severe prison
sentence for a bookmaking conviction.'" This was followed by a
over, the first thing they do is outlaw cockfighting." Boston Globe, Nov. 19, 1978. Former
State Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin has argued that for every dollar raised in gam-
bling revenue five dollars has to be spent "in higher police costs, higher court costs, higher
penitentiary costs and higher relief costs . . . to say nothing of the tragedy of broken lives
and homes. . . .How can one establish great morality by condoning immorality." 75
CHRISTIAN CENTURY 895 (1958).
44. Reuter, supra note 26, at 551. See also Riedel, supra note 27, at 495.
45. Reuter, supra note26, at 553.
46. Id. at 560.
47. 33 N.J. 197, 162 A.2d 851 (1960).
48. In Ivan, the defendant was convicted of bookmaking in violation of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:112-3 (West 1969) (repealed, 1978 N.J. Laws ch. 95 § 2C:98-2, substance reenacted, 1978
N.J. Laws ch. 95 §§ 2C:37-1, -2, -4). The trial court found that the defendant was engaged
in a conspiracy. The defendant refused to name his superiors. The judge sentenced the
defendant to one to two years in prison and imposed a $5,000 fine pursuant to a statute which
provided for a fine not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, or imprisonment for not less
than one year nor more than five years, or both. Id. The defendant appealed on the grounds
that the sentence was too severe in light of the fact that he had no prior conviction, that he
was a good family man and that he had a record of regular employment. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Weintraub, sustained the sentence.
The court justified the sentence as a proper response to gambling offenses which involve
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directive to assignment judges that mandated one judge in each
county be assigned to sentence all gambling cases."
The National Gambling Commission undertook a study of the
results of the Chief Justice's policies. It concluded:
[T]he major finding of this study [is that] the Weintraub policy was imple-
mented in Newark, and the Newark criminal justice system provided more
consistent and stringent enforcement of the gambling codes than either of the
two control cities. . . . [Tihe argument that favors the decriminalization
of gambling laws because they are unenforceable is wrong.50
organized crime:
Here we are dealing with organized crime. . . . He [the defendant] is part and parcel
of an enterprise. The gambling racket is an ancient foe of society. It bilks the weak. It
wrecks homes and destroys men. It spawns embezzlement, larceny and crimes of
violence. It corrupts officialdom. It is reputed to be allied with other illicit traffic. The
"easy" money it yields doubtless finds it way under cover into legitimate fields, there
to continue its polluting course.
Such is the scene a judge should see in dealing with an offense of this kind.
[A] fine would be a license fee for operators-a minor experience [sic expense] in a
lucrative venture.
33 N.J. at 202-03, 162 A.2d at 854.
-49. The Ivan decision set forth a judicial policy that gambling offenses be treated as
serious crimes and that offenders be punished accordingly. The New Jersey Supreme Court
translated this policy into an administrative directive which required the "Assignment Judge
in each county to either personally handle all sentencing in gambling cases or designate a
particular judge to impose the sentence in all such cases, even though the case may have been
tried or the plea taken before another judge." State v. DeStasio, 49 N.J. 247, 249, 229 A.2d
636, 639 (1967). In complying with this directive, harsh sentences and heavy fines were
imposed in numerous gambling cases. In DeStasio, the defendant was convicted of bookmak-
ing and sentenced to a term of one to two years and fined $1,000. Relying on Ivan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court sustained the sentence. In State v. Souss, 65 N.J. 453, 323 A.2d 484
(1974), defendant pleaded guilty to charges of bookmaking and unlawful possession of lottery
slips. The sentencing judge imposed a one to two year prison term and a fine of $1,000 on
the bookmaking charge and a concurrent one to two year prison term on the unlawful posses-
sion charge. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the sentence notwithstanding the fact
that defendant had no prior criminal record, was sixty years old at time of sentencing, had
been steadily employed for thirty two years and his wife suffered from arteriosclerosis. See
also State v. Travis, 133 N.J. Super. 326, 336 A.2d 489 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); State v.
Gattling, 95 N.J. Super. 103, 230 A.2d 157 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967); State v. Goldman,
95 N.J. Super. 50, 229 A.2d 818 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967). In Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117 (1975), the Supreme Court upheld the power of the New Jersey Supreme Court to set
such standards. Id. at 126.
50. Reidel, supra note 27, at 548. The study also concluded:
Moreover, the cost for this enforcement seemed minimal . . . . The conviction rate is
significantly higher in Newark . . . . The vast majority of Newark cases received
prison sentences, while in Washington the most common outcomes were fines or sus-
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Two further arguments are frequently made by proponents of
legalized gambling: organized crime will be hurt and the state will
be helped financially.5 These two arguments rest upon the proposi-
tion that money that would otherwise go to criminals will be di-
verted to state coffers through taxation of legal enterprises. This
proposition is subject to a number of criticisms. First, for money to
be diverted from the illegal market the legal game must be competi-
tive. To be competitive the legal game must duplicate a number of
factors peculiar to each illegal game.52 The illegal operators can offer
credit, free liquor and other serv;ices, including prostitution, that the
government would find difficult to match, although Nevada casinos
are often competitive in these aspects." Second, all games are not
pended sentences. . . . It took cases approximately four times as long to move from
arrest to dispositon in Newark as compared to Washington. This cost notwithstanding,
the central finding of this study is that gambling codes can be enforced and high
conviction rates can be obtained, especially if prosecutors are willing to bring cases to
trial . ..
Id. at 548-49.
For a critque of Chief Justice Weintraub's sentencing policy, see Palmer, A Model of
Criminal Dispositions: An Alternative to Official Discretion in Sentencing, 62 GEo. L. J. 1,
18 (1973-1974).
51. Helsing, supra note 4, at 774-77. Many cities and states feel themselves under severe
economic pressure. Even those locales that are not desperate for funding would like to have
more revenue without incurring the resentment of the citizenry. Gambling revenue appears
to be both painless and voluntary. The revenue-raising argument was made by Bernard
Rome, former President of New-York City's Off-Track Betting Corporation:
I've thought about the morality question, but people are going to bet anyway, and why
shouldr,'t the government profit? With a Proposition 13 mentality growing, it's getting
harder and harder to raise taxes. Wagering is the fastest growing industry in the
country, and OTB could be making a lot more money for the city and state if we
weren't being held back by the political clout that the race-track establishment has
with the Legislature.
OTB Fails to Meet Revenue Goal and to Reduce Illegal Bookmaking, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11,
1979, at B6, col. 1.
For many states the economic argument contains an element of self-defense, i.e., a state
without legal gambling may consider legalization hs the only way to prevent its residents from
spending their discretionary income in a neighboring jurisdiction. For example, in the first
year of operation 80% of New Hampshire's lottery tickets were purchased by residents of
Massachusetts, New York and Connecticut. The recommendation of the New York Casino
Gambling Study Panel that casino gambling be legalized was based, in part, upon this
argument. CASINO GAMBLING STUDY PANEL OF NEW YORK STATE, FINAL REPORT 2 (August 1979)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. See also Rosen, supra note 18, at 808. Thus, a cycle of
escalation and retaliation is inevitable.
52. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 145-66.
53. TASK FORCE ON LEGALIZED GAMBLING, EASY MONEY 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as EASY
MONEY].
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necessarily interchangeable. Lotteries do not necessarily attract the
horse bettor or the numbers bettor under the price and payout struc-
ture most prevalent among lotteries today. 4 Third, illegal gambling,
particularly the numbers operation, has been described as a social
structure as well as a commercial enterprise.55 A legally run substi-
tute could only match the existing social network by licensing the
present operators who are professional criminals. Another factor,
especially important to big bettors, is secrecy. Here, the illegal oper-
ators have a distinct advantage that can hardly be matched by
publicly run operations. Illegal operators are free from legal ac-
countability and financial regulations allowing them to operate in
a fluid and convenient manner."s
The government-approved operation does have a competitive
advantage in some important aspects. Legal betting is not subject
to the possibilities of blackmail. Illegal operators have a reputation
for using violence to collect big losses and for occasionally not pay-
ing off big winnings. The legal operation is more reliable and less
hazardous. In addition, many players would presumably switch to
a legal operation simply because they would rather obey the law
than violate it. However, notwithstanding the legal game's benefi-
cial aspects, they do not appear great enough to divert a large
amount of business from the illegal operations.'
54. Numbers Game is Still Thriving Despite the OTB, N.Y. Times, April 25, 1978, at 39,
col. 1. See also OTB Fails to Meet Revenue Goal and to Reduce Illegal Bookmaking, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1979, at B6, col. 1.
55. S.C. DRAKE & H. CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS ch. 17 (1945).
56. See generally EASY MONEY, supra note 53. See also A. KORNBLUM, THE MORAL HAZARDS
16 (1976). Illegal gambling is not completely free of legal accountability. Casino operators
and players must report gambling earnings in their income tax returns. Section 61 of the
Internal Revenue Code provides for the taxation of all income from any source. Judicial
interpretation of this section has ruled that gambling winnings are to be included in gross
income. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943). It is clear, however, that few individu-
als comply with this requirement. The Internal Revenue Service has recognized the difficulty
in enforcing the statute and does not devote any specific resources to its enforcement.
GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 14.
57. EASY MONEY, supra note 53, at 24. See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text. It
has been suggested, moreover, that the legalization of one form of gambling leads to an
increase in all forms of gambling, legal and illegal. "A climate has been created to gamble.
Because it now is possible to bet legally on horses, thousands of people who never in the world
would have thought of betting on football or basketball or baseball are now betting with the
bookies." U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., April 1, 1974, at 68. The National Gambling Commis-
sion study showed no increase in illegal gambling. Kallick, supra note 28, at 174. A Congres-
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Furthermore, legalization does not diminish the influence of or-
ganized crime but merely allows changes in the forms it takes. ' The
history of casino gambling is replete with evidence of links with
illegal enterprises. 9 Recently, new allegations of links between Ne-
vada and New Jersey casinos and organized crime have been
made.'6 One factor contributing to this development is the large
amount of cash casinos constantly handle.6' Many opportunities
inevitably exist for theft. A second factor is the traditional source
of investment in the casino industry. Conventional lenders have
shunned casinos, viewing them as a "pariah" industry.2 As a result,
entrepreneurs have frequently turned to tainted sources 3 and other
sional study, however, questioned the accuracy of this report. Melnick & Crocker, A Review
of Two Studies on Gambling in the United States in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app.
2.
58. Duncan, supra note 36, at 592.
59. Illegal enterprises have been associated with various forms of illegal gambling since
the 1920's. In fact, illegal gambling enterprises have proved to be "an activity well suited for
[illegal enterprises] to take over and develop." KING, supra note 1, at 24. Nevada casinos
have been linked with various crime figures numerous times since legalization occurred in
that state. Peterson, Gambling-Should it be Legalized?, 40 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 259,
325 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Peterson]. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 52
(1967); THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING, supra note 11; Cook, Gambling Inc., THE
NATION, Oct. 22, 1960, at 257.
60. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that officials of the Stardust Casino in
Nevada are the target of a federal investigation into hidden ownership by organized crime in
the Nevada gaming industry. In addition, federal officials discovered a bundle of hundred
dollar bills in a Stardust casino money wrapper on a suspected dope-smuggling plane in
Florida in October, 1979. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1979, at 6, col. 1. The Journal also recently
reported that a manager of a Resorts International Casino in the Bahamas loaned $4,200 of
casino money to the Secretary of the Bahamian government gambling board. The loan was
repaid after a gambling inspector learned of the existence of the loan. Wall St. J., Dec. 5,
1979, at 48, col. 1.
61. I sat on a ladder overlooking the dice table, paper and pencil in hand, and
kept track of all wagers for five hours. During that period $3 million went back and
forth across the table from players to dealers and dealers to players. This was the gross
betting handled, and yet only $40,000 actually changed hands by the end of the five
hour period.
J. SCARNE, SCARNE'S COMPLETE GUIDE TO GAMBLING 205 (1961).
62. J. SKOLNICK, HOUSE OF CARDS: THE LEGALIZATION AND CONTROL OF CASINO GAMBLING 141
(1978) [hereinafter cited as SKOLNICK].
63. Id. The Teamsters Central States Pension Fund has been a great source of investment
capital for Nevada casinos. "According to figures released by the fund's director at the close
of 1976, a total of $269 million was invested in Nevada casinos out of $1.4 billion in total fund
assets." Id.
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interests associated with elements of organized crime" to finance
construction and expansion of hotels and casinos. Moreover, the
pressure to raise revenue may cause state officials to relax the en-
forcement of rules designed to prevent corruption."
Assuming the validity of the proposition that legal gambling
would divert business from the illegal to the legal arena, it is ques-
tionable whether the promised economic benefits will materialize.
The revenues promised by proponents represent large amounts of
money in absolute terms. However, the amount of money raised by
gambling revenue is far less than might be expected.'
"[G]ambling profits represent on the average of two or three per-
cent of the annual state-level revenue in States where one or more
forms of gambling are legal.""7 In addition, the typical legalized
gambling game shows a period of slow growth in revenue for the
state followed by a rapid decline. Over time the revenue curve re-
sembles a letter "J" on its side." The shape of the curve is the result
of the initial interest in the new game followed by a satiated market
and a rapid drop in player interest." Gambling as a business re-
quires constant promotion.10 Although it is unclear exactly how long
the players will remain interested in a game without additional
64. See E. REID & 0. DEMARIS, GREEN FELT JUNGLE (1963). Investment in the casino in-
dustry is particularly risky because casinos operate at the whim of the legislature. A casino
license is a revocable privilege and no holder acquires any vested right therein. NEV. REV.
STAT. § 463.170(l) (1977). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(8) (West Supp. 1979-1980);
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, §§ 75, 77 (1972). Political and economic considerations obviously
dictate against revoking casino licenses once a casino opens. See note 148 infra.
65. Temporary licenses were granted to Bally Manufacturing Corporation and Resorts
International notwithstanding that neither company had complied with several statutory
requirements. See notes 230-32 infra and accompanying text. The New York Times criticized
the hasty manner in which these temporary licenses were granted and called for the mainte-
nance, "or, more accurately," the revival, of statutory requirements. Acrobatics in Atlantic
City, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1979, at A30, col. 1. Similarly, one of Nevada's top gambling
regulators recently resigned, partly in protest over the speed with which several gambling
licenses were granted. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
66. Helsing, supra note 4, at 777.
67. Id. See also B. ROME, The Harsh Realities of Casino Gambling 2 (May 16, 1979)
(newsletter published by People Against Casinos, Inc.)
68. Vrooman, An Economic Analysis of the New York State Lottery, 29 NAT'L TAX. J. 482
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Vrooman]. See also Rosen, supra note 51, at 805.
69. "OTB has saturated the market. It may very well have no where to go but down."
OTB Fails to Meet Revenue Goal and to Reduce Illegal Bookmaking, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11,
1979, at B6, col. 1 (quoting James Heffernan, President of the N.Y. Racing Association).
70. EASY MONEY, supra note 53, at 17; see also Vrooman, supra note 68.
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promotion,7' it appears that a state can expect a new game to bring
in gradually more money for about the first eighteen months before
there is a sudden decrease in revenue." This time period is sufficient
for the state to enjoy the fruits of the new game, spend the money
so generated and prepare the state budget with the expectation
that at least an equal amount of gambling revenue will appear dur-
ing the next fiscal year. With a sudden drop in revenue, the state is
forced to take counter measures, such as advertising and creating
new variations to increase player interest. Soon the state finds itself
in the gambling business, actively promoting the game and trying
to attract new players.73
Moreover, a tax on gambling revenue is costly and regressive. It
costs one and a half to two cents to collect a regular tax dollar but
approximately thirty-seven cents to collect a net lottery dollar.74
Only legal casino gambling is not regressive and even this progres-
sivism is reversed when the playing sample is limited to local resi-
dents.15 For example, casino gambling in Nevada is, on the whole,
progressive in its economic impact on casino patrons, approximately
twice as progressive as the federal income tax.'" This follows from
71. Vrooman, supra note 68, at 482.
72. Id. at 485.
73. Even though the revenue raised is small relative to the total budget demands of the
state, the additional one to three percent gained can establish groups interested in its preser-
vation, such as the bureaucracy that runs the program, recipients targeted for expenditures
of gambling-raised revenue and incumbent office holders who would be forced to turn to other
sources if this funding disappeared. Rosen, supra note 51, at 809-10.
74. Id. at 812.
75. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 61, 98. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 56.
76. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 61.
TABLE 2
REGRESSIVITY OR PROGRESSIVITY BY
TYPES OF GAMBLING
Index of progressivity (P) or regressivity (R)
Nevada
U.S. as a residents
Game whole only
Numbers .44 (R)
Sports cards .40 (R)
Lottery .31 (R)
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the fact that many casino patrons are tourists who can afford to
travel to Nevada and stay several nights at resort hotels." However,
the economic picture changes considerably when only Nevada resi-
dents are surveyed. Gambling attracts low-income residents more
readily than wealtier members of the community." In addition,
compared to wealthy residents, low-income residents gamble a
higher percentage of their income.7 As a result, legal gambling is
three to four times as regressive as sales and excise taxes in its
impact on Nevada's local population.8" This means that casino gam-
bling hurts most those who can least afford to gamble.
Legal casino gambling also has adverse financial consequences on
those in direct competition for the gambling dollar. While legal
casinos do not impair the operation of illegal gambling enterprises,"'
they may siphon business from established legal gambling opera-
tions. Existing legal operations must compete for the players' dis-
cretionary spending under legal and practical restraints that put
them at a distinct disadvantage vis-A-vis casinos.2 The result is
Nevada
U.S. as a residents
Game whole only
Bingo .30 (R) .58 (R)
Horse books .27 (R)
Horse tracks .17 (R)
Off-track horse betting parlors .07 (R)* .56 (R)
Slot machines .41 (R)
Keno .26 (P) N/A
Casino tables .46 (R)
Legal sports-betting parlors - .36(R)
Illegal sports books .29(P) t
All types combined .17 (R) .42 (R)
For comparison: all sales and
excise taxes .15 (R) N/A
Federal income tax .15(P) N/A
*New York OTB only.
tSample too small to permit reliable estimate.
Id. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 56.
77. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 98.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text.
82. As an example, horseracing has to pay a set amount to the track operators in the state;
it cannot change the odds or its methods of operation the way illegal operators can. Also,
gambling at horseracing is slow by comparison to casinos and bets are few; horseraces tend
to flourish in locals that do not have wide-open casinos. EASY MONEY, supra note 53, at 50.
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odd. Operators of existing legal gambling enterprises openly lobby
against casino gambling, often arguing on moral grounds. For exam-
ple, Bernard Rome, former chairman of the New York Off-Track
Betting Corporation, formed the People's Campaign Against Casi-
nos to oppose the legalization of casinos in New York. He has de-
scribed casino gambling as the "most immoral" sort of betting:
They have music, noise, free liquor, chips to help you pretend you're not
losing your money. They're the most dangerous form of gambling. . . . New
York is a great city. . . . I don't want to see Mayor Ed Koch turn it into a
second-rate gambling town. Is that a renaissance?1
3
Like all forms of major social legislation, the legalization of casino
gambling would redistribute wealth in society to some extent. Those
who would benefit the most are the successful casino entrepreneurs,
usually large corporations and wealthy individuals. 4 Other benefici-
aries include casino employees, shareholders, contractors and others
directly tied to the development and operation of casino hotels.
Indirect beneficiaries of legal casinos are landowners and businesses
fortuitously located in the path of casino expansion,"5 the targeted
recipients of the casino tax revenue and the host city. The host city
would experience a general growth in business and income made
possible by increased tourism."5
The most important problem with the argument that legalized
gambling will raise revenue and fight crime is that these two goals
are incompatible."7 To fight crime the legal game must be competi-
tive and must offer the player a better proposition and payout than
can the illegal operator. To do so, however, especially within the
structure of a state bureaucracy, requires foregoing the extra profits
such an enterprise can generate. Moreover, to strive for increased
83. OTB Chief Terms Koch "Arrogant" and Condemns Backing of Casinos, N.Y. Times,
March 16, 1979, at Al, col. 5.
84. The licensing investigations create high cost entry barriers. For example, the initial
investment for Atlantic City's first hotel casino was approximately ninety million dollars.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 33.
85. A few local people in.Atlantic City who owned strategically located property sold to
developers at inflated prices. "Most of the owners quickly agreed to sell their homes for one
hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars each. Only a year before, the structures
had been assessed at $15,000 to $20,000." N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1979, at 22, col. 3.
86. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at
54, 89-93.
87. EASY MONEY, supra note 53, at 8; GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 1.
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revenues requires the state to actively promote gambling which
will attract people who have never played the illegal games. In
sum, controlling crime and corruption requires limiting the number
of licenses and other outlets; increasing revenue requires increasing
the availability of licenses and outlets.
8
A third argument offered by proponents of legalized gambling is
that gambling is merely another form of entertainment and will
flourish despite prohibitive laws.8' This reasoning leads to the
"Prohibition" analogy, i.e., because people will gamble the imposi-
tion of paternalistic laws invites widespread violations and erosion
of respect for the legal system. While there are enough devoted
gamblers to maintain a profitable market for illegal operators even
if all forms of gambling were outlawed, most people can be deterred
from betting by imposing barriers of cost and inconvenience."' Fur-
thermore, a state may legitimately enact legislation to protect its
citizens from harmful vices.' The "Prohibition" analogy ignores the
statistically proven correlation between the availability of gambling
and the rate at which people will bet.'"
Gambling can create problems not only for players and their fami-
lies, but for the surrounding community as well. Pauperization and
gambling addiction, loan sharking and robbery, prostitution and
suicide, are all endemic to areas of wide-open gambling. 3 A state,
despite its need for additional revenue, must face the moral di-
lemma: to what extent should the state promote an activity that can
cause harm to many of its citizens and communities? 4
88. EASY MONEY, supra note 53, at 8.
89. Bahmueller, State Policy and the Ethics of Gambling in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra
note 1, app. 1. at 754.
90. See note 57 supra.
91. People v. Lavin, 179 N.Y. 164, 71 N.E. 753 (1904). "[Tlhe prohibition and regulation
of gambling in all forms and lotteries of every kind are unquestionably valid exercises of
legislative power." Id. at 168, 71 N.E. at 754.
92. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 98. Seventy-eight percent of those questioned
in Nevada bet on something in 1974, compared to sixty-one percent of the national popula-
tion. The incidence of betting is approximately ten to twenty percent higher in N-evada among
all demographic groups. Id. See also Kallick, supra note 28, at 174-75.
93. A correlation has been shown between the availability of gambling and severe person-
ality disorders. In Nevada, for example, the percentage of compulsive gamblers, suicides and
alcoholics is highest in the United States. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 74; see Joyce,
Social Aspects of Gambling in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 1, at 337; FINAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 58-62.
94. The issue seems to be whether the state should try to protect its citizens from them-
1980]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
Another new problem for casinos is the state role vis-A-vis the
players. Pari-mutuel betting and lotteries involve the state acting
as the stakeholder, facilitating the betting and allowing it to con-
tinue unmolested, in exchange for a percentage of the total stake.
Casino games usually involve the bettor playing against the house.
If the house is viewed as an arm of the state, an image of government
as the adversary can be created. This is especially true if the casino
can extend credit and is forced to participate in the collection of
gambling debts."'
Finally, an old problem can become an enlarged new one if
the state becomes an active promoter of casino gambling or allows
private casinos to actively advertise." Horseracing has tradition-
ally used the excuse of "improving the breed" to justify its exis-
tence; betting was only secondary.97 Casinos have only the image
of gambling as entertainment. Active promotion of casinos among
the state's citizens could be construed as the strongest moral ap-
proval of all forms of gambling. The individual would see nothing
wrong with any form of bet. Yet society may still wish to proscribe
some forms of gambling, such as betting on professional sports
selves, make gambling available while controlling the negative side effects, or encourage an
activity that may be detrimental to some but good for the society as a whole. Proponents have
implicitly adopted the third view since almost all legal gambling in the United States is
promoted actively. Opponents have taken the first view.
95. The Final Report of the Casino Gambling Study Panel recognized the problems inher-
ent in state ownership and operation of gambling facilities. "[I]f [legalized gambling] is a
socially-accepted activity with some potentially destructive and addictive qualities it must
be properly controlled by the State and not exploited by it. The public perception of the State
as the vigilant regulator of casinos should be clearly distinquishable from the actual operation
casinos." FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 34.
96. This problem was recently addressed in a New York Times editorial. The Times of
derided the recent aggressive advertising campaign by New York's Off-Track Betting Corpo-
ration. The Times complained that "to urge betting on those not normally interested in horses
when they can least afford it .. . is a nasty business for government. We vote for the old
hucksters who had the good sense to make OTB seem tolerably benign: 'Bet With Your Head,
Not Over It.'" N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1979, at A30, col, 1.
97. The original justification for racing, "improving the breed," has long since gone
by the board. From a strictly utilitarian standpoint, the horse is practically out of
business, superseded by the automobile, the airplane, the tractor, motor-driven farm
implements and even the bicycle and motorcycle . . . . Despite that undeniable fact,
racing's prosperity increases every year, with more tracks, greater attendance and
larger pari-mutuel handles.
C. MCQUAID, GAMBLER'S DIGEST 165 (1971).
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teams, amateur high school, sports events or election results. "
Despite the weaknesses of the arguments in favor of legal gam-
bling, the trend presses in the direction of wider legalization. This
inevitable spread of legalized gambling in the United States may be
explained by the confluence of several moral, economic and political
factors. Due to the legalization of gambling in several states9 the
moral arguments against legal gambling have lost much of their
98. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 12, at 67.
99. TABLE 8
LEGALIZED GAMING IN THE STATES
(As of October 1971)
Sports Off-track Horse Dog Card
Stats Lotterese Numbers batting betting racing racing Jai alai Cainos room# Bingo Other
A labam a .......... ... . . . ." ... I ... ... ... . . ...
A l a k a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . , . . . .*.. . . . .
A rizona ........... ... . ....
A rkansas ....... .. ....... ... ...
California ......... * *.. ... ...
Colorado ........... ... * * ... *...
Connecticut ........ * * * ... *
Delaware ....... * . * *
Florida ............ * .. * . . *
Georgia ............ ... ... ... ... ... *
H aw aii ............ ... ..... . .... ... . . ... ...
Id ah o .... ..... ... " ." • .. . ..
Illinois . .. ..... * .. ... .*...
Indiana ............ ... . .. .. ... 0 ... ... ...
Iow a .. ............ ... ...... ... ... ... ... *
K an sas ............ ...... . .... ... ...
Kentucky . ........ . .. ... .
Louisiana .. . .. . .. . . . . . .
M aine .... * ... ... ... *...
M aryland .......... .. . * . ... ... ... *
Massachusetts ...... * * . * *
Michigan .......... * * ... *
M innesota ... .. ... *... . ... ... ... ... ... ...
M ississippi ........ . ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
M issouri ......... .. . . .... ... ...
* Legalized and operative.
0 Legalized but not now operative.
(a) Operated by bookmakers licensed by state.
(b) Keno.
(c) Operative as of 1978.
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force and appeal. The fiscal plight of many states and municipali-
TABLE 8 (Continued)
LEGALIZED GAMING IN THE STATES
(As of October 1977)
Sports Ofi-track Horse Dog Card
State Lotteries Numbers betting betting rocing rowing Jaialai Casinos rooms Bingo Other
Montana ... ...... .* *
Nebraska .......... ... ... . . *
Nevada ............ .. *.(a) *(a) * * * ' ... * *(b)
,,New Hampshire .... * * * ... ... *
New Jersey ....... * * (* . . ) . *
New Mexico ... ..... ... ......... .... ... ... *
New York ....... * * * ... *
N orth Carolina .... ... ... ... . . ... ... . . ... ... *
North Dakota ...... . . . . .. ... .. ... *...
Ohio . ............. * .. ... * *
O klahom a ........ .. ... ... ... . . .... *...
Oregon . ........... * * . ..... * *
Pennsylvania ...... *. *
Rhode Island ..... * * * * *
South Carolina ... .... *
South Dakota . * *.. *
Tennessee .......... *... ... ...
T exa s .... ....... .. . . ...... ... ... . . ... ...
U tah .............. . . . .. . . .
Vermont . ......... . .. * ..
Virginia ... ........ *
Washington .. . . ... . .. .* * ..
West Virginia .... *
W isconsin ......... .. . . *"
W yom ing .......... ... . . ... ... .. ...
• Legalized and operative.
* Legalized but not now operative.
(a) Operated by bookmakers licensed by state.
(b) Keno.
(c) Operative as of '978.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, RESE
notes 1-10 supra and accompanying text.
ARCH BRIEF, LEGALIZED GAMBLING 6 (1978). See also
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ties encourages the search for "easy money."'' 0 Furthermore, the
process of legalization, once set in motion, is catalyzed by the com-
petition among the states for the gambling dollar. 0' And, finally,
the creation of special interest groups dependent upon the gambling
enterprise and the need to secure profitable public participation in
the legal games assure the continued, active state promotion of
gambling both as an industry and as an acceptable pastime.02
IV. Models of Casino Control
There are four primary models of casino control from which a
state may choose. Those are: 1) Nevada's "free enterprise" model
which emphasizes control through licensing, regular audits and in-
vestigations; 2) New Jersey's and Puerto Rico's "tourist area revital-
ization" model which ties control to licenses and large scale develop-
ment investments; 3) England's "strict social control" model which
limits casino play and availability by paternalistic judgments of the
authorities; and 4) "state ownership," either total or partial, with
leasing arrangements to private entrepreneurs for restricted casino
games.
The concept of legal casino gambling is such a radical departure
from the present legal system that the actual means chosen of im-
plementing control does not appear to be a decisive factor in the
decision to legalize.' 3 Thus, the state legislature has wide discretion
in its decision of which control model to choose. While differing in
their main objectives, all four models can be tested to see to what
extent they address the issues demanding control: preventing cor-
ruption in all its forms, assuring the competence of key casino oper-
atives, maintaining the flow of tax dollars and encouraging other
100. See note 51 supra.
101. Id.
102. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
103. For example, the discussion in New York State of where to legalize casino gambling
is only peripherally concerned with the issue of control. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 21
(Long Island Weekly), at 1, col. 4; id., May 2, 1977, at 56. This issue, however, has not been
completely ignored. The Casino Gambling Study Panel recently confronted the issue of con-
trol and concluded that "should the people vote for casinos in New York, the proper and most
significant role of government is to assure that the 'house' perform all of its functions in
accordance with the law and its license requirements, and not to seek a device whereby the
state can become the 'house.'" FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 37-38.
19801
268 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
revenue raising and economic growth while limiting adverse side
effects and expanding the options available to citizens in a free
society.
A. Nevada: The Free Enterprise Model
The Nevada Gaming Control Act"4 explicitly declares that it is
the public policy of the state that the economy of Nevada and the
general welfare of the state's inhabitants depend on the gambling
industry.'" ' To ensure public confidence in the gaming industry
Nevada relies on a system of strict regulation of licensed activities
and regular audits.' °0 Nevada thus openly declares itself beholden
104. NEV. REV. STAT. §j 463.010 to .720 (1973-1977).
105. Id. § 463.130(1)(a). It is interesting to note that state officials have not always felt
that casino gambling could serve the public interest. New York Governor Thomas Dewey
asserted that:
It is fundamentally immoral to encourage the belief by the people as a whole in gamb-
ling as a source of family income. It would be immoral for government to make avail-
able to all of its people a state-wide gambling apparatus with the implied assumption
that the gains of chance were a fair substitute for or supplement to the honorable
business of producing the goods and services by which the people of the nation live.
It would be an indecent thing for government to finance itself so largely out of the
weaknesses of the people which it had deliberately encouraged ....
Obviously if the state puts the imprimatur of approval on the morals and decency
of wholesale, universal betting on sports events of every kind, then there would be no
logic whatever in refusing also to.legalize lotteries, betting pools, dice games, slot
machine and public gambling halls with all their attendant evils with which the
American people are thoroughly familiar. There is no logical place at which the line
could be drawn and law enforcement would then break down completely.
269 ANNALS 36 (1950).
106. Id. § 463.130(1)(b)-(d). The complete statute reads:
1. The legislature hereby finds, and declares to be the public policy of this state,
that:
(a) The gaming industry is vitally important to the economy of the state and the
general welfare of the inhabitants.
(b) The continued growth and success of the gaming industry is dependent upon
public confidence and trust that licensed gaming is conducted honestly and competi-
tively and that the gaming industry is free from criminal and corruptive elements.
(c) Public confidence and trust can only be maintained by strict regulation of all
persons, locations, practices, associations and activities related to the operation of
licensed gaming establishments and the manufacture or distribution of gambling de-
vices and equipment.
(d) All establishments where gaming is conducted and where gambling devices are
operated, and manufacturers, sellers and distributors of certain gambling devices and
equipment in the state shall therefore be licensed, controlled and assisted to protect
the public health, safety, morals, good order and general welfare of the inhabitants of
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to the gambling entrepreneurs and places its trust in the licensing
procedure to secure control. 07
The Nevada regulatory scheme consists of three agencies: the
Gaming Policy Commission, the Nevada Gaming Commission (the
Commission) and the State Gaming Control Board (the Board). The
Gaming Policy Commission is comprised of eight part-time mem-
bers with the Governor acting as chairman."" The Governor is au-
thorized to call meetings of the gaming policy committee for the
exclusive purpose of discussing matters of gaming policy."' Recom-
mendations made by the Gaming Policy Commission are only advi-
sory and do not bind the Board or the Commission.""
The Commission"' consists of five full-time members"2 appointed
by the Governor." 3 No commissioner may be actively engaged in
gaming activities or have a direct pecuniary interest in any gaming
activity. "4 The Commission has the final authority to require, issue,
deny, suspend or revoke a gambling license." 5 Additionally, the
Commission has the power to adopt gaming regulations"' and in-
voke disciplinary action."7
the state and to preserve the competitive economy and policies of free competition of
the State of Nevada.
Id. § 463.130.
107. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 83.
108. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.021 (1977). The committee consists of one member of the
Commission, one member of the Board, one member of the state senate, one member of the
state assembly, two representatives of the general public and two representatives of gaming
licensees. Id.
109. Id. § 463.021(6).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 463.022.
112. Id. § 463.023. The Commission members must be citizens of the United States and
residents of the State of Nevada. No member may hold an elective office in state government
nor may a member be an officer or official in any political party. "It is the intention of the
legislature that the commission shall be composed of the most qualified persons available,
preferably no two of whom shall be of the same profession or major field of industry; but no
person actively engaged or having a direct pecuniary interest in gaming activities shall be a
member of the commission." Id. § 463.023(3).
113. Id. § 463.024(1). The Governor may remove any commissioner "if, in his opinion,
such commissioner is guilty of malfeasance in office or neglect of duty [orl at any time
without stated cause with the concurrence of a majority of the legislative commission." Id. §
463.024(5).
114. Id. § 463.023(3).
115. Id. §§ 463.140(2), 463.310(4).
116. Id. § 463.145.
117. Id. § 463.140(2).
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The Board"'' is composed of three full-time members"' appointed
by the Governor.U0 The Board is organized into three separate divi-
sions: administrative, fiscal and surveillance.' The administrative
division performs all general administrative and clerical functions
of the Board and the Commission.' The fiscal division conducts
economic research, collects taxes and performs auditing functions. :
The surveillance division performs all enforcement and investiga-
tive functions of the Board.' 4
The Commission has wide discretion in deciding who must apply
for a license. In addition to those which the statute requires to be
licensed,' 5 a license is required for whomever, "in the opinion of the
Commission, has the power to exercise a significant influence over
the licensee's operation of a gaming establishment . ... To
obtain a license an applicant must be investigated by the Board.
The Board must be satisfied that the applicant is of "good charac-
ter, honesty and integrity,' 27 has no criminal record or reputation' 5
and "in all other respects [is] qualified to be licensed or [isI found
suitable consistently with the declared policy of the State."'29 Addi-
118. Id. § 463.030.
119. Id. § 463.060. Board members may not be a member of a political organization or
engaged in any party activity. Id; § 463.060(2). Additionally, "a member shall not be pecuni-
arily interested in any business or organization holding a gaming license under this chapter
or doing business with any person or organization licensed under this chapter." Id. §
463.060(3).
120. Id. § 463.050(2).
121. Id. § 463.075(l).
122. Id. § 463.075(2).
123. Id. § 463.075(3).
124. Id. § 463.075(4).
125. An owner of a gambling operation must be licensed. Id. § 463.160(1). Key employees
must be licensed. Id. § 463.165(1). Other employees of a gambling operation must hold a valid
work permit. Id. § 463.335(3). A corporation, partnership or any other form of business
association must be licensed. Id. §§ 463.160(1), (463.0124). All officers, directors and other
key personnel of business associations must be licensed individually if, "in the judgment of
the commission, the public interest will be served." Id. § 463.530. A manufacturer, seller or
distributor of gambling equipment or material must be licensed. Id. § 463.650(1).
126. Id. § 463.650(1). Section 463.165 gives the Commission discretionary authority to
require a license from any other person. These statutes were upheld in connection with the
Federal Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), in United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856 (9th
Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Goldfarb, 464 F. Supp. 565 (D.C. Mich. 1979).
127. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.170(2)(a) (1977).
128. Id. § 463.170(2)(b).
129. Id. § 463.170(2)(c).
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tionally, a license to operate a casino will not be granted unless the
applicant has adequate business experience in gambling"" and the
proposed financing of the entire operation is "adequate for the na-
ture of the proposed operation; and from a suitable source.""' The
burden is upon the applicant to prove his qualifications."'2 "A claim
of privilege with respect to any testimony or evidence pertaining to
an application may constitute sufficient grounds for denial.""' The
Board has the full and absolute power to recommend the denial of
an application for a license.'3 Should the Board recommend ap-
proval, its recommendation is presented to the Commission."' The
Commission may approve or disapprove the application. :" In prac-
tice however, the Board's decision is usually followed.'37
The Board and the Commission have authority to continuously
supervise a licensee's operation. 3 The authorities may inspect gam-
ing premises 9 and gambling equipment."0 In addition, the au-
130. Id. § 463.170(3)(a).
131. Id. § 463.170(3)(b).
132. Id. § 463.170(1). The statute explicitly states that "[N]o applicant for a license or
other affirmative commission approval has any right to a license or the granting of the
approval sought. Any license issued or other commission approval granted pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter. . . is a revocable privilege, and no holder acquires any vested right
therein or thereunder." Id. § 463.130(2).
133. [19591 Nev. Gaming Comm'n Reg. 4.020.
134. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.140(2), 463.210(3) (1977). A recommendation of denial of
an application "shall be without prejudice to a new and different application if made in con-
formity to regulations applicable to such situations." Id. § 463.210(4) (1975). The gaming
authorities' power is more limited with present license holders. See Nevada v. Rosenthal, 93
Nev. 36, 559 P.2d 830 (dictum), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
135. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.220(1) (1975).
136. Id. § 463.220(2)-(4). A recommendation by the Board for denial can only be over-
ruled by a unanimous vote of the Commission. SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 234.
137. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 84. The entire approval procedure is estimated
to cost an applicant $100,000. Id. In addition to the procedure outlined above, an applicant
who receives state approval for a license must also receive a license from the sheriff of the
county wherein it is proposed that a gaming operation is to be conducted. NEV. REV. STAT. §
463.230 (1975).
Judicial review of a final decision by the Commission is available. A review is conducted
by a district court in the county in which the petitioner resides or has his or its principal
place of business. Such review is conducted by the court without a jury and "shall not be a
trial de novo but shall be confined to the record on review." Id. § 463.315. See M & R
Inv. Co. v. Nevada Gaming Comm'n, 93 Nev. 35, 559 P.2d 829 (1977).
138. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.140(2) (1977).
139. Id. § 463.140(3)(a).
140. Id. § 463.140(3)(b).
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thorities may demand access to all papers, books and records.' No
unqualified person may be involved in any facet of a gambling en-
terprise4 ' and a transfer of ownership of a gaming operation is
strictly prohibited.'
The statutory scheme concerning financial practices is as strict as
that concerning licensing. The Commission is directed to prescribe
minimum procedures for internal audits with which licensees must
comply. " Periodic financial reports must be made to the Commis-
sion' and licensees must open their books to independent audi-
tors. " '
141. Id. § 463.140(3)(d).
142. Id. § 463.140(2).
143. "It is unlawful for any person to sell, purchase, lease, hypothecate, borrow or loan
money, or create a voting trust agreement or any other agreement of any sort to or with any
licensee in connection with any gaming operation, except in accordance with the regulations
of the commission." Id. § 463.300. See also id. § 463.510(1).
144. Id. § 463.157 states:
The commission shall by regulation:
1. Prescribe minimum procedures for adoption by each nonrestricted licensee to
exercise effective control over its internal fiscal affairs, which shall include but are not
limited to provisions for:
(a) The safeguarding of its assets and revenues, especially the recording of cash and
evidences of indebtedness; and
(b) The provision of reliable records, accounts and reports of transactions, operations
and events, including reports to the board and the commission.
2. Provide for the adoption and use of internal audits, whether by qualified internal
auditors or by accountants holding a permit to practice public accounting. ...
145. Id. § 463.158 provides:
The commission shall by regulation require periodic financial reports from each non-
restricted licensee, and:
1. Specify standard forms for reporting financial condition, results of operations and
other relevant financial information.
2. Formulate a uniform code of accounts and accounting classifications to assure
consistency, comparability and effective disclosure of financial information.
3. Prescribe the intervals at which such information shall be furnished. ...
146. Id. § 463.159 provides:
1. The commission shall by regulation require audits of the financial statements
of all nonrestricted licensees with an annual gross revenue of $1,000,000 or more. Such
audits shall be made not less frequently than once a year and whenever the ownership
of such a nonrestricted licensee changes.
2. The commission may require audits of the financial statements of nonrestricted
licensees with an annual gross revenue of less than $1,000,000 and whenever the owner-
ship of such a nonrestricted licensee changes.
3. The audits provided for in subsections I and 2 shall be made by independent
accountants holding permits to practice public accounting in the State of Nevada.
4. Regulations for such audits shall require, among other things, that:
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In sum, the gaming authorities have almost unlimited discretion
in granting, withholding or revoking a license. By statute the
gaming authorities are exempt from Nevada's Administrative Pro-
cedure Act," 7 and, by ruling of the Nevada Supreme Court, they are
exempt from the requirements of the United States Constitution.11
(a) The independent accountants shall submit an audit report which shall express
an unqualified or qualified opinion or, if appropriate, disclaim an opinion on the
statements taken as a whole in accordance with standards for the accounting profes-
sion established by rules and regulations of the Nevada state board of public accoun-
tants, but the preparation of statements without audit does not constitute compliance.
(b) The examination and audit shall disclose whether the accounts, records and
control procedures maintained by the licensee are as required by the regulations pub-
lished by the commission pursuant to NRS 463.156 to 463.1592, inclusive.
147. NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.039(1)(e), .039(f) (1977).
148. State v. Rosenthal, 93 Nev. 36, 559 P.2d 830, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
In Rosenthal, the defendant appealed from a decision of the Nevada Gaming Commission
which denied his application for a gaming license. The defendant alleged that the decision
was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by any evidence. The district court held that
the licensing provisions of the Nevada Gaming Control Act were unconstitutional for want
of standards, although this issue was not raised by the defendant on appeal. The Supreme
Court of Nevada reversed, reinstating the decision of the Nevada Gaming Commission. In
doing so the court held:
We view gambling as a matter reserved to the states within the meaning of the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Within this context we find no room
for federally protected constitutional rights. This distinctively state problem is to be
governed, controlled and regulated by the state legislature and . . . by the Nevada
Constitution. It is apparent that if we were to recognize federal protections of this
wholly privileged state enterprise, necessary state control would be substantially dim-
inished and federal intrusion invited.
93 Nev. at 44-45, 559 P.2d at 836.
However, the debate over states' rights is not completely dead. On August 6, 1979, the
casino in the Aladdin Hotel in Las Vegas was ordered closed by the unanimous vote of the
Nevada Gaming Commission, the first major Las Vegas casino closure in history. The closure
was ordered after the corporation and four individuals were found guilty by a jury of allowing
hidden control of the casino by criminal interest. A few hours after the casino had been closed,
it was ordered reopened by a federal judge. Variety, August 8, 1979, at 62, col. 1. The order
of the district court has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit on the grounds, inter alia, that
the federal court had no jurisdiction to intervene into state control of legalized gambling.
The National Gambling Commission has sided with the State of Nevada in proclaiming
that the regulation of gambling, legal and illegal, is a matter properly within the scope of
state sovereign immunity:
The Commission has concluded that States should have the primary responsibility for
determining what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders. It
believes that the only role of the Federal Government should be to prevent interference
from one State with the gambling policies of another and to protect identifiable na-
tional interests with regard to gambling issues. In line with these conclusions, the
Commission recommends: that Congress consider enacting a statute that would insure
the State's continued power to regulate gambling [and] that the Federal Government,
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Clearly, legalized casino gambling in Nevada has been successful
in raising revenue. In 1978, the State of Nevada received over $80
million from casino activity.'49 In addition, Nevada is consistently
among the fastest growing states in the union with the least tax
burden on its citizens and the most recession-resistant industrial
base. 5 0 These facts do not prove that any state can be as successful
as Nevada. Much of this economic strength derives from the ex-
pendable income of visitors from other states. In effect, Nevada has
grown by siphoning money from its neighbors.' 5 ' Thus, such eco-
nomic growth could not be duplicated on a nationwide basis unless
the country as a whole could bring in gambling revenue from neigh-
boring nations. Moreover, because Nevada was a small state eco-
nomically when it legalized gambling in March, 1931 the advent of
legalized gambling did not adversely affect existing special inter-
ests. 
52
The success of the Nevada statute in preventing corruption has
been mixed. The National Gambling Commission found that, com-
pared with fifteen years ago, the presence of organized crime was
negligible.'5 3 Skimming'54 was generally prevented, although theft
by employees was more frequent.'55 These findings, however, can
be disputed by recent well publicized court cases and investiga-
tions by government agents that revealed hidden crime ties and
massive skimming operations within Nevada's casinos.'56
in the exercise of its regulatory and tax powers, take care not to hinder State efforts
to compete with illegal gambling operations.
GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 2.
For a discussion of the federal role in fighting illegal gambling see Rose, What me Gamble?
Slot Machine Operators vs. the Law, GAMBLING Q., Jan. 1977, at 37. (The Gambling Quarterly
was subsequently published under the name "Winning"). For a discussion of possible Con-
gressional responses to the Commission's conclusion see Blakey & Kurland, The Development
of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923 (1977-1978).
149. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
150. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 80.
151. Id.
152. SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 108-18.
153. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 78.
154. "Skimming" is the process "whereby a portion of the casino revenue disappears from
the official count." Id. at 86. See also SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 47-48.
155. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 78.
156. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. See also L. A. TIMEs, Dec. 28, 1977, at 1,
col. 1; State Gaming Officials Say Millions Vanished From Agent's Slots, Wall St. J., Sept.
10, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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The state has been more successful in ensuring competence on the
part of the applicant and all key employees by requiring all persons
associated with licensed corporations to be licensed., 7 This has
brought about the rise of a professional management class for its
legal casinos. Individual casinos have folded through bankruptcy,
but the continued growth of the industry through periods of reces-
sion and inflation' 8 and the development of college level courses in
management illustrate the achievement of a high industry-wide
level of competence." 9 The implications on corruption have been
mostly positive; it has become more difficult for thieves to steal
from the casino either internally or through raids from the outside.
Jerome H. Skolnick's detailed study of Nevada casinos' revealed
a number of weaknesses in the licensing control scheme including
the vagueness of the gaming control statutes,' the mixture of inves-
tigatory and adjudicatory functions delegated to authorities, the
casual disregard by officials of Nevada's Open Meeting Law' and
principles of due process.'"' These criticisms seem unduly harsh and
legalistic given the attraction of legal gambling for sophisticated
criminal organizations. It is relatively easy for such an organization
to find or create a front man with a spotless record and to hide the
criminal control through layers of corporate structures and mach-
inations. 4 It is inherent in the nature of legalized gambling, then,
that the control of individuals can be obtained only through prohibi-
tively expensive investigations or through the use of subjective stan-
dards. The Nevada authorities have opted for the latter while at-
tempting to perform investigative functions within their limited
resources. Given these restrictions and Nevada's open policy in
favor of expanding the casino industry, the gaming authorities ap-
157. See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text.
158. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING, supra note 11, at 459.
159. A special session dealing with problems in casino management was held at the
Fourth Conference on Gambling, sponsored by the University of Nevada-Reno, held on Dec.
17-19, 1978. Experts presented papers on casino management, marketing and economics, as
well as special symposia on state lotteries, the compulsive gambler, mathematics and gam-
bling behavior. For a review of papers presented, see ROUGE ET Nomn, Jan.-Feb., 1979, at 7.
160. See SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 239-330.
161. Id. at 229.
162. NEV. REV. STAT. § 241 (1960).
163. SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 234.
164. Id. at 321.
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pear to have performed well with relatively minor infringements of
individual rights.'
A more fundamental weakness is the system's complete disregard
for potential side effects. Nevada puts only minimum restrictions on
the construction and operation of casinos once the applicant has
proven his worth morally and financially. The wide-open avail-
ability of "restricted" gambling licenses has resulted in the install-
ment of slot machines in restaurants, grocery stores and even the
state prison.' No provisions are made for setting odds, rates of
payout, minimum and maximum betting limits, hours of casino
operation and other factors directly related to the impact a casino
will have on the people it is designed to attract.6 7 The Nevada gam-
ing authorities believe that the competition created by the free
enterprise system ensures that the public will be treated fairly.
However, this has not proved to be the case. In Nevada the per-
centage of compulsive gamblers, suicides and alcoholics is the high-
est in the United States.'
The Nevada model has been partially successful in expanding the
range of choices available to its citizens. Not everyone can gamble
in Nevada legally, but the most common restrictions of age and
economic access are identical to those placed on other controlled
activities nationwide, such as drinking.' The Gaming Commission
has the power to exclude individuals 'from gambling;7 0 this power,
165. See THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING, supra note 11, at 446-53 and accom-
panying footnotes for a discussion of all of Nevada's gambling related cases arising since 1949.
166. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.373(1) (1975). Restricted licensees can have up to 15 slot
machines. Casino authorities have refused an application to place slot machines in a home
for the aged. SKOLNICK, supra note 71, at 266. [1959] Nev. Gaming Comm'n Reg. 3.010
specifies other locations, such as children's public playgrounds, that the board may recom-
mend as being unsuitable for gaming licenses. In one interesting development, Nevada's
policy came into direct conflict with its neighboring State of California over the effects on
the environment of Lake Tahoe of continued casino expansion. 9 CAL. J. 77 (March 1978).
167. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 103.
168. See note 93 supra.
169. Bahmueller, supra note 89, at 767.
170. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.151 (1977). This section specifically provides that the Com-
mission may exclude from a casino game an individual:
(a) Who is of notorious or unsavory reputation;
(b) Who has been convicted of a crime which is a felony in the State of Nevada or
under the laws of the United States, a crime involving moral turpitude or a violation
of this chapter; or
(c) Whose presence in a licensed gaming establishment would, in the opinion of the
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however, has been exercised to a limited extent.'7 ' Although the
state has, for the most part, amply fulfilled its duty in allowing its
citizens the right and opportunity to gamble if they so wish, the
same cannot be said of the opportunity to own a casino. The main
barrier is an economic one: obtaining a license through a compre-
hensive background check and meeting the requirements of finan-
cial security' are simply beyond the means of all but a handful of
board and commission, be inimical to the interests of the State of Nevada, or of
licensed gambling, or both.
171. "Crime figure Anthony (Tony the Ant) Spilotro was unanimously voted into the
state's list of excluded persons by the Nevada Gaming Commission. Spilotro . . . becomes
the ninth name in the 'Black Book' which prohibits him from entering any casino in Nevada.
Spilotro's attorney, Oscar Goodman, said the Nevada Gaming Commission action was
'unAmerican in the truest sense of the word.' " L. V. Faces Test of "Black Book", An
"Exclusive List of Mobsters," Variety, Dec. 6, 1978, at 85.
The issue of whether a citizen has a "right" to gamble in a legal casino is presently being
fought in the courts of Nevada and New Jersey, not by "mobsters," but rather, by expert
card counters. Expert counters, by keeping track of which cards have already been played
and by making rapid mathematical calculations, can vary their play and achieve a statistical
advantage over the casino. E. THORP, BEAT THE DEALER (1966). The casinos have sought to
exclude card counters because these players represent a great economic threat. The first suit
brought by a card counter to prevent this exclusionary policy was Estes v. Nevada, No. 10420
(Nev. Sup. Ct. 1978). Estes was evicted from the Las Vegas Hilton casino under a casino
policy that excluded all card counters. Plaintiff sued the hotel, the state, and the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department alleging violations of various state and federal laws and
seeking an injunction. His federal challenges were under the fourteenth amendment and 42
U.S.C. § 1983:
The exclusion policy is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because it subjects persons to loss without prior notice and the opportunity to
be heard . . . also . . . because it is arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, the exclu-
sion policy is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because (1) card counters are the only legitimate players who are systematically ex-
cluded from playing blackjack at the Hilton and (2) persons blacklisted pursuant to
NRS 463.151 are entitled to a hearing under that statute but card counters are not,
thereby discriminating impermissibly between card counters and persons otherwise
similarly situated.
Brief for Appellant at 25, Estes v. Nevada, No. 10420 (Sup. Ct. Nev. 1978).
Unlike the situation in Nevada v. Rosenthal, 93 Nev. 36, 559 P.2d 830, appeal dismissed
434 U.S. 803 (1977) (see note 148 supra), the issue presented in these cases is the extent to
which the federal rights of gamblers may be infringed. Arguably, the state's interest in
protecting the integrity of the gaming industry is less compelling in this instance to allow
state control boards to ignore federally protected rights. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1979,
at B3, col. 6 (New Jersey's casino control commission ordered Atlantic City's two casinos to
permit card counters to play blackjack, but modified the rules to make it harder for them to
beat the odds).
172. See notes 130-31 supra.
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individuals. A successful small corporation or other business could
meet the expense only if it could afford the risk of license denial and
loss of sunk costs. This is not to say that the system is therefore
inherently unfair. Obtaining a commercial television license from
the Federal Communications Commission is just as far beyond the
reach of the average individual, and the justification for background
checks and controls is more evident and supportable in the case of
casino licenses. However, the point of acknowledging that this limi-
tation does exist is to refute the free enterprise, entrepreneurial
ideal that casino licensing advocates sometimes promote.' The
truth is that even in Nevada casino ownership is not available to the
rugged individualist and, as will be seen, reality is even further from
the ideal in the New Jersey and Puerto Rico models.
B. New Jersey and Puerto Rico: The Tourist Model
The State of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
have taken Nevada's system of licenses and audits and added an-
other layer of control by tying licenses to the growth of targeted
tourist areas. This last means of control is designed to effectuate the
policy of restoring and maintaining the state's resort industry., In
New Jersey, casinos are limited to Atlantic City'75 and must be
connected to an approved hotel of at least 500 sleeping units.'76
Puerto Rico regulations are even more specific. The island is divided
into zones, each with a specified minimum tourist facility require..
ment.'"
The regulatory scheme in New Jersey is comprised of two govern.-
173. NEv. REv. STAT. § 463.130(4) (1977); [1959] Nev. Gaming Comm'n Reg. 4.010.
174. New Jersey's public purpose declaration is surprisingly candid about the bleak future
facing Atlantic City without a revitalization of its resort facilities. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-
1(3) (West Supp. 1979-1980). That declaration states that the general welfare, health and
prosperity of the state and its inhabitants require a properly developed tourist resort and
convention industry. Legalized casino gambling is seen "as a unique tool of urban redevelop-
ment for Atlantic City." Id. § 5:12-1(4). The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico declares that
legalized gambling is intended to "contribute toward the development of tourism by authoriz-
ing certain games of chance customary in recreation resorts in famous tourist centers through-
out the world . . . and at the same time affording the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto
Rico an additional source of revenue." Act of May 15, 1948, No. 221, § 221 as amended by
Act of June 23, 1956, No. 90, § 2 (appended to P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, §71 (1972)).
175. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1(5), -27 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
176. Id. § 5:12-82, -83.
177. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, § 76 (Supp. 1978).
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ment agencies: the Casino Control Commission (the Commission)",
and the Division of Gaming Enforcement (the Division).' y The
Commission is authorized to hear and decide applications for licen-
ses, to conduct hearings pertaining to civil violations of the act, to
collect all license fees and taxes and to police the operation of casi-
nos. 110 The Division is authorized to investigate applicants for licen-
ses, conduct continuing reviews of casino operations through on-site
observation's' and conduct audits of casino operations." '
The regulatory scheme in Puerto Rico is less detailed.' 3 The Sec-
retary of the Treasury (the Secretary) and the Puerto Rico Tourist
Development Company (the Company)18 share authority for grant-
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-50 (West Supp. 1979-1980). The Commission consists of five
members. Each member must be a citizen of the United States and a resident of New Jersey.
No member may hold an elective or appointive office in federal, state or local government
and no more than three members of the Commission may be of the same political affiliation.
Id. §§ 5:12-50, -51.
179. Id. § 5:12-55. The Division is actually an agency of the Office of the Attorney General
and the director of the division is an Assistant Attorney General. To prevent conflicts of
interest and abuse by officials in the exercise of their discretionary authority, the statute sets
forth specific requirements concerning qualifications of commission members and officers of
the Division. Id. § 5:12-52. A person affiliated with a casino operation may not be a member
of the Commission or the Division until such affiliation has been terminated for at least three
years. Id. § 5:12-58. Additionally, no member of the Commission may hold any "direct or
indirect interest in, or be employed by, any applicant or by any person licensed by or regis-
tered with the Commission for a period of four years commencing on the date his membership
on the Commission terminates." Id. § 5:12-60.
180. Id. § 5:12-63.
181. Id. § 5:12-76(6).
182. Id. § 5:12-76(7).
183. Puerto Rico's gaming control statute consists of a meager thirteen sections and is
compiled in fourteen pages. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15 §§ 71-74 (1972 & Supp. 1978). In 1974
and 1976, amendments were added authorizing slot machines. See P.R. LAws ANN. § 71
(Supp. 1978). Many of the details codified in New Jersey and Nevada do not exist in
Puerto Rico's statute; instead, much of this detail is left to the Company's regulations. Id.
§§ 72, 76, 77.
184. The powers and duties of the Economic Development Administration, which had
previously exercised regulatory authority under Puerto Rico's casino control act, was trans-
fered to the Company in 1970. Id. tit. 23, § 6 7 1p (Cum. Supp. 1978). The powers of the
Company are exercised by a five member Board appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico
with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are no comparable provisions to New
Jersey's conflict of interest and membership qualification requirements. In fact, "the officers
and employees of any agency or dependency of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may be
appointed by the Company without need of examination." Id. § 671f(b). Rather, the Public
Service Personnel Act governs. Id. tit. 3, §§ 1301-1351 (Cum. Supp. 1977 & Supp. 1978). The
act provides that all public employees are covered by a single personnel system. Id. § 1311.
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ing licenses'" and collecting license fees.' 5 In contrast to New Jer-
sey's law," 7 the statute does not describe explictly the procedures
for issuing gambling licenses.8 " The Company is directed to divide
the island into license zones'89 and is responsible for supervising the
operation of gambling casinos."10
New Jersey requires that owners,"' employees,' 2 corporations,' 3
185. Id., tit. 15, § 73 (Supp. 1978). Real control is apparently vested in the Company. No
license may be granted without its approval. Furthermore, the Company is required to con-
sider, in addition to those requirements set forth in section 72, economic factors designed to
preserve and protect Puerto Rico's tourist industry. Id. See note 212 infra and accompanying
text.
186. Id. §§ 74, 76(2).
187. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-64, -65, -66, -67 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
188. See notes 208-16 infra and accompanying text.
189. P.R. LAws ANN. § 76(1) (Supp. 1978).
190. Id. § 76a (1972).
191. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 82 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
192. Id. § 5:12-89. The statute distinguishes between two kinds of casino employees:
"casino employee" and "casino key employee." The former is:
Any natural person employed in the operation of a licensed casino, including, without
limitation, boxmen; dealers or croupiers; floormen; machine mechanics; and barten-
ders, waiters and waitresses or other persons whose employment duties require or
authorize access to the casino but who are not included in the definition of casino hotel
employee, casino key employee, casino security employee, or principal employee ....
Id. § 5:12-7.
The latter is:
Any natural person employed in the operation of a licensed casino in a supervisory
capacity or empowered to make discretionary decisions which regulated casino opera-
tion, and who is not within an employee category defined elsewhere in this act, includ-
ing, without limitation, pit bosses, shift bosses, supervisors, and cashiers; casino man-
agers and assistant managers; managers or supervisors of casino security employees;
and any other employee so designated by the Casino Control Commission.
Id. § 5:12-9.
Similar requirements for licensing apply to both groups. See id. §§ 5:12-89(b), -90.
193. Id. § 5:12-82. To hold a gambling license a corporation must be incorporated in the
State of New Jersey and maintain an office in the licensed premises. Id. § 5:12-82(d). A
corporation is ineligible for a license unless each director, a holder, directly or indirectly, or
an equity interest, and
any person who in the opinion of the commission has the ability to control the corpora-
tion or elect a majority of the board of directors of that corporation, other than a
banking or other licensed lending institution which holds a mortgage or other lien
acquired in the ordinary course of business; each principal employee; and any lender,
underwriter, agent or employee of the corporation whom the commission may consider
appropriate for approval or qualification would, but for residence, individually be
qualified for approval as a casino key employee. . ..
Id. § 5:12-85(c).
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and sellers and distributors of gambling equipment'94 apply for gam-
ing licenses. Each applicant for a casino license must demonstrate
to the satisfaction of the Commission that he owns an "approved
hotel,"'95 has the financial means and business competence to run
a casino,"' and has a "good reputation for honesty and integrity.."" 7
An applicant is automatically disqualified"8 if he fails to provide the
Commission with adequate information and documentation to
prove the above requirements. 9' He may also be disqualified if
he has been convicted of a capital offense, high misdemeanor or
misdemeanor,00 or is shown to be a member of a cartel such that
there is a reasonable belief that the association "is of such a nature
as to be inimical to the policy of the act and to gaming opera-
tions."20' Casino employees, 2 2 hotel employees,20 3 and service indus-
tries and their employees04 must meet similar requirements.205 The
194. Id. § 5:12-92. "All casino service industries offering goods or services on a regular
basis which directly relate to casino or gaming activity . . . shall be licensed in accordance
with the provisions of this act .... " Id. § 5:12-92(a). Additionally, owners, management
and supervisory personnel must qualify under the standards, except residency, established
for qualification of casino key employees. Id. §§ 5:12-82, -83.
195. -Id. 89 5:12-82, -83.
196. Id. § 5:12-84(a):
Each applicant shall produce such information, documentation and assurances con-
cerning financial background and resources as may be required to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the financial stability, integrity and responsibility of the
applicant, including but not limited to bank references, business and personal income
and disbursement schedules, tax returns and other reports filed with governmental
agencies, and business and personal accounting and check records and ledgers. In
addition, each applicant shall, in writing, authorize the examination of all bank ac-
counts and records as may be deemed necessary by the commission or the division.
197. Id. § 5:12-84(c):
Each applicant shall produce such information, documentation and assurances of
good character as may be required to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
applicant's good reputation for honesty and integrity. Such information shall include,
without limitation, information pertaining to family, habits, character, criminal and
arrest record, business activities, financial affairs, and business, professional and per-
sonal associates, covering at least the ten-year period immediately preceding the filing
of the application.
198. Id. § 5:12-86.
199. Id. § 5:12-86(b).
200. Id. § 5:12-86(c).
201. Id. § 5:12-86(f).
202. Id. 99 5:12-89, -90.
203. Id. § 5:12-91.
204. Id. § 5:12-92.
205. The Commission is empowered to enforce these provisions by issuing subpoenas and
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Commission may conduct hearings to consider an applicant's quali-
fications. 2111 The applicant has the burden of proof for establishing
qualifications for licensure. °7 If an application is denied, the appli-
cant may petition the Superior Court for judicial review.'"'
In Puerto Rico, a casino license may be granted only if the appli-
cant proves, to the satisfaction of the Secretary, that he owns a
hotel, restaurant, casino, clubhouse or other "bona fide amusement
place proper for tourists,"' " has the means and commercial organi-
zation to operate a casino, 10 has not been convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and enjoys "good stand-
ing" in the community."' After meeting these requirements, the
applicant must convince the Company that it is in the economic
interests of the Commonwealth in general, and the tourist industry
in particular, for a casino to be licensed at the proposed location." 2
compelling the attendance of witnesses, id. § 5:12-65, by conducting investigations and hear-
ings, id. § 5:12-66, and, under certain conditions, by granting immunity to witnesses, id. 5:12-
67.
206. Id. §§ 5:12-87(a),,-87(b).
207. Id. § 5:12-80(a).
208. Id. § 5:12-110. The statute provides that, generally, filing an appeal shall not stay
enforcement of the Commission's decision. The reviewing court may either affirm the Board's
decision or reverse if it finds that "the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because
the decision is: 1) in violation of constitutional provisions; 2) in excess of statutory authority
and jurisdiction of the commission; or 3) arbitrary or capricious or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law." Id. § 5:12-110(c). As in Nevada and Puerto Rico, a casino license is a
revocable privilege in which the licensee cannot accrue a property right. Id. § 5:12-1(8).
See P.R. LAws ANN. §§ 75, 78 (Supp. 1978).
209. P.R. LAws ANN. § 72(a) (Supp. 1978).
210. Id. § 72(c). A transfer of control is strictly limited:
No person other than the licensee and his employees may operate a gambling hall, nor
shall the same be located at a place other than the one stated in the license. No
transfer, assignment or cession of any share of or interest in the license shall be carried
out without having previously obtained the written approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Tourist Development Company. Any transfer, cession or assignment,
without the previous approval hereinbefore provided, or the concealment in any way
of the real owner of the gambling hall; or of any share or participation in the person
holding a license shall entail cancellation of the license.
Id. § 75.
211. Id. § 72(b). In the case of a corporation or other business association, all shareholders
or partners must fulfill this requirement. Moreover, the Secretary is directed to hold actual
owners, not merely nominal owners, to this requirement. Id.
212. Id. § 73. In approving a license, the Company is directed to consider the number of
existing licenses, the location of such licenses and "the kinds and quality of the facilities
offered by the concessionaries which shall best serve the purposes of this act, which are those
of encouraging for, and providing tourists with, attractions and accommodations at a level
with international standards, and which will best serve to promote tourism." Id.
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Gambling room employees, such as managers, cashiers, and crou-
piers, must also apply for licenses."' Other persons "engaged in any
activity connected to the operation of gambling places" must meet
requirements set forth by the Company.2"' Application hearings are
not statutorily required. The applicant is merely required to file
with the Secretary." ' There is no explicit statutory provision for
judicial review if the application is denied.18
New Jersey provides for continuing supervision of casinos and
licensees in several ways. All licensees and registrants have a
"continuing duty to provide any assistance or information required
by the commission or division, and to cooperate in any inquiry or
investigation conducted by the division or . . . the commission."' 7
The kinds of games permitted in a casino may not be changed
without prior approval by the Commission.' A casino licensee must
keep proper financial records"' available for inspection by the Com-
mission at all times during operating hours.2 0 The Division is re-
sponsible for conducting continuing reviews of casino operations
"through on-site observation and other reasonable means" '' and for
conducting audits of the casino enterprises."22 If a licensee fails to
comply with the act and regulations, his license is subject to revoca-
tion.23
213. Id. § 78.
214. Id. § 76a. In contrast to New Jesey, Puerto Rico does not specify what requirements
these personnel must meet. The Company has the authority to issue regulations setting forth
the requirements to be met. Id.
215. Id. § 73.
216. Furthermore, a decision by the Secretary or the Company to suspend or cancel a
license is not appealable. Id. § 78. The broad powers conferred by the entire act on the
Secretary and the Company are nowhere more evident than in this provision.
217. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-80(d) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
218. Id. § 5:12-96.
219. Id. § 5:12-99.
220. Id. § 5:12-96(e).
221. Id. § 5:12-76b(6). The Division has the power, inter alia, to inspect the premises of a
casino operation, to summarily seize equipment and supplies and to "inspect the person, and
personal effects present in a casino facility licensed under this act, of any holder of a license
issued pursuant to this act while that person is present in a licensed casino facility." Id.
222. Id. § 5:12-76(b)(7). The Commission is also empowered to inspect a licensee's finan-
cial affairs and to set forth internal financial controls with which a licensee must comply. Id.
§ 5:12-70(1)(m), -70(1)(n), -99.
223. Id. § 5:12-129(3), -129(4). To protect and preserve the interests of innocent parties,
upon the revocation of a casino license, the Commission may appoint a conservator. See id..
§§ 5:12-130.1 to -130.11.
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Puerto Rico ensures that its casinos are properly managed in sev-
eral ways. The continuation of a casino or employment license is
conditioned upon compliance with the standards applied to the ini-
tial issuance of a license.22' The Secretary is empowered to conduct
audits2 5 and the Company is authorized and directed to monitor
"the bets and operations of the games of chance in the casinos or
clubhouses . ". . . I" Both the Secretary and the Company may
revoke the license of any licensee found to be in violation of any of
its statutory responsibilities. 27 The suspension or cancellation of a
gambling license is final and unappealable.22'
Unique to the New Jersey and Puerto Rico casino control acts are
statutory requirements designed to control the casino market and
to direct economic growth. 2 In New Jersey, casinos .are limited to
Atlantic City and must be housed in a hotel.2 :11 This geographic
restriction is designed to target the economic benefits of legal casi-
nos in Atlantic City. 23' The additional requirement that casinos be
housed in hotels "is designed to assure that the existing nature and
tone of the hospitality industry in . . . Atlantic City is preserved
and that the casino rooms licensed . . . are always offered and
maintained as an integral element of such hospitality facilities,
rather than as the industry unto themselves that they have become
in other jurisdictions. 2 32 The number of casino hotels,' :: gambling
hours,2 34 advertising2 3' and junkets2 3' are strictly limited. Finally, all
224. P.R. LAWS ANN. § 73 (Supp. 1978). See notes 209-14 supra and accompaying text.
225. P.R. LAWs ANN. § 74 (Supp. 1978).
226. Id. § 76a.
227. Id. § 78.
228. Id.
229. The fact that Nevada casinos are concentrated in Las Vegas and Reno is a result of
free market forces, not statutory requirements. Furthermore, Nevada does not impose re-
quirements on the kinds of games or the odds of play as do New Jersey and Puerto Rico.
See notes 166-67 supra and accompanying text.
230. See note 209 supra and accompanying text.
231. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(4) (West Supp. 1979-1980). The public purpose declaration
states that decisions on licensing hotels/casinos should also be consistent with preserving
and enhancing environmental and aesthetic aspects of Atlantic City. Id. §§ 5:12-1(10)-(11).
See also id. § 5:12-70(r).
232. Id. § 5:12-1(5).
233. Id. § 5:12-1(6).
234. Id. § 5:12-97.
235. Id. §§ 5:12-70(o), -70(r).
236. Id. §§ 5:12-102, -29.
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funds received from the licensing procedure and taxes on gambling
revenue are deposited in the "Casino Revenue Fund. . . exclusively
for reductions in property taxes, rentals, telephone, gas, electric,
and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citizens and disa-
bled residents of the State . . . . 13 In Puerto Rico, the Company
is directed to divide the Commonwealth into zones to further com-
mercial and tourist development. 38 No gambling room is permitted
to advertise or offer its facilities to the public of Puerto Rico. 39
Unlike New Jersey, proceeds of the licensing procedure and gam-
ing tax are not promised to a specific class of residents. Instead,
all fees and taxes are deposited in the general treasury.249
The statutory requirements in the "tourist model" for targeting
growth to specific locations"' results in costly entry barriers for po-
tential casino operators. These barriers established, on a short-term
basis, a legal monopoly for the first successful casino applicant in
Atlantic City, Resorts International Hotel, Inc.242 On a long-term
basis, there have been severe limitations on the number of success-
ful casino applicants, with only three casinos in Atlantic City and
twelve casinos in Puerto Rico now operating. 43 Such restricted
growth naturally limits the potential economic and tax benefits
derived from gambling. However, the system appears successful in
its attempt to target the growth that does occur. Like Nevada's
licensing system, the tourist area jurisdictions have attempted to
prevent corruption and sever any possible ties to organized crime by
denying licenses to undesirables.2 " In theory, limiting casinos to
237. Id. § 5:12-145(c). The constitutional amendment allowing casinos to open in Atlantic
City, New Jersey provided that any state revenue derived from the newly legal gambling
would "be applied solely for the purpose of providing reductions in property taxes, rentals,
telephone, gas, electric and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citizens and disabled
residents of the State." N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7, 2. This type of earmarking of gambling
revenue has been criticized. Recently, the targeted beneficiaries of New Jersey's casino gam-
bling revenue have complained that they have yet to benefit by the state revenue raised
through legal casino gambling. Jersey's Elderly Say Casino Tax, Pledged to Them, is of Little
Aid, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1979, at Al, col. 3.
238. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, § 76 (1972).
239. Id. § 77.
240. Id. § 74.
241. See notes 230 & 238 supra.
242. See note 15 supra.
243. Gambling Times, March 1978, at 33.
244. See notes 201 & 211 supra and accompanying text.
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tourist areas and large hotels should make it easier to control cor-
ruption and organized crime because there would be fewer appli-
cants to investigate and fewer operating casinos to police. The size
restrictions of the accompanying hotel limit the applicants to the
larger corporations in the recreational field. The great costs neces-
sary to operate a casino"' may not preclude the influence of organ-
ized crime, but, in theory, it does subject the few applicants to
closer scrutiny and force operators to screen their ties more care-
fully.
Puerto Rico has been more successful in controlling corruption
than Nevada. It is difficult to find a report of any incidence of
corruption or criminal influence in Puerto Rico's casino industry."!
This commendable result may be due either to the severe restric-
tions placed on the issuance of licenses or to the different histories
and sizes of operations of the two locales.247 New Jersey, with only
three casinos operating, has not been as fortunate. The Attorney
General of New Jersey recommended denying Resorts International
a permanent license."4 ' An investigation of the company discovered,
in part, that in establishing and running a casino in the Bahamas,
Resorts had dealings with a business associate who had a record of
association with criminal individuals; that Resorts continued its
relationship with an individual of "unsuitable reputation, charac-
ter, and nature" after being ordered by the Bahamian government
to sever the relationship; that Resorts "maintained an unrecorded
cash fund from which it rendered payments to Bahamian public
officials;" and that Resorts currently employs an individual "who
has admitted in sworn testimony an attempt to bribe a judge and
supplying paid female companions to Bahamian public officials." '49
245. It is estimated that an applicant must spend at least $50 million before one dollar of
revenue is generated. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1977, § 11, at 25, col. 1.
246. J. SCARNE, SCARNE'S COMPLETE GUIDE TO GAMBLING 205 (1961).
247. See id. at 225 (Puerto Rico); E. REID & 0. DEMARIS, GREEN FELT JUNGLE (1963).
248. Statement of Exceptions, In Re Casino License Application of Resorts International
Hotel, Inc. (filed by John J. Degnan, Attorney General of New Jersey (Dec. 4, 1978)).
[hereinafter cited as Statement of Exceptions]. Control experts had previously recom-
mended denying Resorts a temporary permit. Variety, April 18, 1979 at 52.
249. Id. See also DIvISION OF GAMING ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC
SAFETY, ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, REPORT TO THE CASINO CONTROL COMMISSION
WITH REFERENCE TO THE CASINO LICENSE APPLICATION OF RESORTS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC.
(1978).
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Despite the Attorney General's recommendation and report, and
the fact that the applicant has the burden of proving compliance
with the requirements for obtaining a license, Resorts was issued a
permanent casino license. " ' The applications of Caesars World and
Bally for casino licenses in Atlantic City have revealed similar links
with organized crime. Nevertheless, the Commission has granted
licenses to both applicants, 5' although certain restrictions were
imposed on their corporate activity.2 11
Strict limitations on the number of licenses does have some ad-
verse consequences on competence because there is a restriction on
the size of the job market. This can be overcome to some extent by
market forces-competent employees mean more profit for the ca-
sino. However, in practice, it takes time to achieve competence.253
Among the charges leveled against Resorts International in the At-
torney General's report was its incomplete accounting system which
allowed tens of thousands of dollars in slot machine change to disap-
pear. 2' 1 This represented loss not only to the casino owners but to
the taxpayers of New Jersey as well.
Targeting the growth and location of casinos minimizes adverse
side effects more effectively than the Nevada free enterprise statute.
One of the major adverse consequences of legal gambling is the
regressive economic impact on the local citizens.2 5 By prohibiting
advertisementss and the admittance of local citizens to the casi-
nos,2 7 Puerto Rico has alleviated the latter problem. In fact, be-
cause Puerto Rico is an island and the casinos are limited to expen-
250. Resorts Wins a Permanent License to Operate Casino in Atlantic City, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 27, 1979, at Al, col. 3.
251. See notes 60-65 supra and accompanying text.
252. To receive a temporary permit to operate a casino in Atlantic City, the chairman of
Ceasars World was required to take an unpaid leave of absence from his position with the
New Jersey subsidiary while the state investigated allegations that he had organized crime
associations. Bally received a temporary permit only after its president and chairman agreed
to sever all of his relations with Bally while the state investigated allegations of his associa-
tions with organized crime figures. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1979, at B2, col. 3.
253. M. GOODMAN, YOUR BEST BET 188 (1975). The opening of Bally's casino, Park Place,
was delayed two days because, inter alia, casino workers needed more practice. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 30, 1979, § 1, pt. 2, at 32, col. 2.
254. Statement of Exceptions, supra note 230, at 11.
255. See notes 74-80 supra and accompanying text.
256. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (Supp. 1978).
257. Id.
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sive resort hotels, the Commonwealth has designed an economically
progressive system by siphoning money away from other locales.
New Jersey has attempted to reach the same end by limiting
casinos to the resort area of Atlantic City.25 It remains to be seen
whether such measures are effectual or even enforceable, especi-
ally in a private enterprise, revenue raised experiment conducted in
a locale more accessible than Puerto Rico.
The financial gain produced for the state from casino gambling
has been substantial. The National Gambling Commission con-
cluded that in Puerto Rico, the eleven hotels and casinos represent
"the base of the island's tourist industry." '59 In one and a half years
time three casinos have opened in Atlantic City and four more com-
panies have made plans to open casinos and hotels. The operating
casinos have thus far reported handsome profits.""1 In addition, be-
cause the tourist-oriented casinos, by definition are established in
specific locales for the purpose of encouraging the influx of revenue,
existing facilities and special interests are seldom hurt financially.
Not all the economic effects are beneficial. Competing tourist
areas can be hurt by the public's sudden attention to the new gam-
bling center. If the out-of-state tourist industry cannot prevent le-
galization ih a neighboring state,2"' it often is forced to lobby for
legalization in its own jurisdiction for self-protection. 62 This can
lead to a series of retaliatory moves by several neighboring states.
A state that imposed limited tourist area casinos with the best
intentions of limiting their growth could find itself faced with over-
whelming competition from neighboring locales. The state may then
be forced to choose between allowing great expansion of gambling
258. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-82 (West Supp. 1979-1980). New Jersey also regulates adver-
tising, id. § 5:12-70(o), and limits the hours of operation, id. 5:12-97, but does not prohibit
its citizens from entering casinos, id. § 5:12-100(a).
259. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 100.
260. See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
261. It is a persistent rumor in Sacramento, California, that it is Nevada's lobbying effort
which keeps casinos out of that state.
262. Casino-type gambling has already been legalized in this area [New Jersey]. I
believe the State of Pennsylvania should receive their share of the revenue that would
be lost to New Jersey. Since many of the residents of Pennsylvania will be going to
New Jersey to gamble, my bill attempts to keep part of this revenue in the State. I
have no control over legalized gambling in this area, since this was done by the State
of New Jersey.
Letter from Ralph A. Garzia, Pennsylvania House of Representatives regarding his House Bill
68 (1977) to legalize casino gambling.
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or permitting the entire operation to fail. After committing time,
money and political reputations to the gambling experiment it is
unlikely that state decision-makers would be willing to close down
the casinos when they can regain a competitive edge simply by
relaxing the restrictions on their growth.
Market access to casino ownership is as difficult in the tourist
model states as they are in Nevada.6 3 By limiting the availability
of casino licenses to wealthy individuals and large corporations, the
tourist-oriented states have explicitly adopted the discriminatory
market forces implicit in the Nevada model. Applicants for other
government licenses, e.g., radio or television, can overcome market
forces through organization. Applicants for casino licenses cannot
do the same because a fundamental criterion of certification is the
financial wealth and stability of the applicants."' All individuals
that are in positions of ownership must go through the expensive
licensing process . 5 A similar barrier exists for the patrons of the
casinos. Puerto Rico explicitly prohibits its casinos from offering
their facilities to the Puerto Rican public."' This goes far beyond the
market forces that limit the clientele at Nevada casinos.
With barriers both to ownership of and admission to casinos, it
becomes increasingly difficult for a state to justify its decision to
legalize casinos on any ground other than revenue-raising. The state
has not acted to facilitate free choice among its citizens; it has
attempted to create an attraction to siphon money into the area
from outside jurisdictions. Other reasons for legalization become
unimportant and the state is left only with the open search for more
263. See notes 172-73 supra. See also NEv. Rv. STAT. § 463.130(1) (1977).
264. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 72(b)-(c) (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-84(a) (West
Supp. 1979-1980).
265. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, § 72(b)-(c) (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-85(b)(3)
(West Supp. 1979-1980).
266. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (1972). Additionally, both New Jersey and Puerto Rico
allow casinos to ban patrons who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses or whose
"presence in a licensed casino would, in the opinion of the commission, be inimical to the
interest of the State of New Jersey or of licensed gaming therein, or both." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 5:12-71(a)(3) (West Supp. 1979-1980). See also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 73 (Supp. 1978)
("the licensee who operates a gambling room is hereby empowered to prohibit admittance
into the clubhouse of any person who in his judgment constitutes a hindrance to the operation
thereof, or affects or annoys the well-being and easement of the patrons or employees of the
gambling rooms; Provided, That in regulating the admittance to club-houses no discrimina-
tion by reason of race, color, religion or social condition shall be made.") See note 171 supra.
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revenue. Pressure for more licenses and looser restrictions could
follow. The jurisdiction could follow the route taken by Puerto Rico
and abandon the search for ever increasing revenue in favor of stabi-
lization. If not, the tourist-oriented jurisdiction could find itself
with a system where growth is primary and control is secondary at
best. " 7
C. England: The Club Model
Casinos in Great Britain were legalized for purposes far different
from those behind legalization in Nevada or New Jersey. In Eng-
land, gambling is seen as a social evil to be controlled, not a means
of raising revenue for the state.118 In addition to a system of licensing
and continuing supervision through on-sight surveillance and au-
dits, Great Britain adds a superstructure of controls, paternalistic
in their design, that completely overwhelm the basic system. The
emphasis is consistently on limiting gambling and its perceived
adverse side effects. "[If casino gambling were to disappear en-
tirely from the English scene, the gaming board would be congratu-
lated."2"'
Casino gambling is regulated by the Gaming Board for Great
Britain (the Board).270 The Board is empowered to grant licenses
and supervise gaming operations.27" ' Its power is plenary, although
limited procedures for judicial review are available.2
Casino gambling is limited to private clubs which must be certi-
267. The New York State Casino Gambling Study Panel has recommended legalizing
casino gambling and enacting a control statute similar to the New Jersey Casino Control Act.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 39-50. The Report recommended that private casinos be
permitted in at least a half dozen locations. The Panel Report ignored the issue of organized
crime, based its economic forecasts on the incorrect presumption that there would be no
major competition from neighboring states, id. at 7, and minimized adverse side-effects of
legalization upon individuals and the community. Id. at 11, 59, 61.
268. Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65. The act is designed "to control commercial gambling by
introducing a system of licensing and registration of clubs and by imposing new restrictions
in relation to gaming in clubs and by means of gaming machines." Id. Preface. For a general
history of the economic and social forces which led to the enactment of the Gaming Act,
see Gambling in Great Britain, 1945-1976 in DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING,
supra note 11, at 914.
269. SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 335.
270. Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, § 10. The Board consists of a chairman and other members
appointed by the Secretary of State. Id. § 10(1). See id. sched. 2.
271. Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, §§ 10(3), 43.
272. Id. sched. 2, para. 29. See note 253 supra.
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fied by the Board."' A casino license may not be granted to a foreign
corporation or an individual under twenty-one years of age."7 An
applicant for a casino license must have a good "character, reputa-
tion and financial standing."27 ' The Board is authorized to take into
consideration "any other circumstances appearing to them to be
relevant in determining whether the applicant is likely to be capable
of, and diligent in" the operation of a casino club.7 Most impor-
tantly, the Board must find that a substantial demand for casino
gambling exists in the community "on the part of prospective
players for gaming." ' If the Board finds that these criteria are
met the licensing authority in the jurisdiction in which the pro-
posed club is to be situated must either recommend or deny the
application . Should the licensing authority deny the application,
the applicant may appeal to the court of quarter sessions7 ' which
"may deal with the application as if it had been made to the court
. . .in the first instance."8 0 The judgment of the court is final. 8 ,
A player must obtain certificate of approval to take part in a
casino game. 82 A casino employee is required to obtain a certificate
of approval if his duties involve assisting the gaming by operating
or handling any apparatus, cards, tokens or other articles used in
273. Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65 § 11(1). See id. scheds. 2, paras. 3, 7. A "licensing
authority" is actually responsible for granting a license. However, to apply for a license an
applicant must receive a certificate from the Board allowing him to apply for a license to a
licensing authority. Id. sched. 2, para 3(1). Furthermore, there are no provisions for appealing
a Board decision not to grant a certificate. The licensing authority is directed to take into
account advice given the Board. See id. sched. 2, paras. 19(2), 28.
274. Id. sched. 2, para. 4(4).
275. Id. sched. 2, para. 4(6). In the case of a corporation, the manager and other benefici-
aries of the license must be qualified. Id. sched. 2, para. 6(b). Transfers of control are strictly
limited. Id. sched. 2, para. 55.
276. Id. sched. 2, para. 4(6).
277. Id. sched. 2, para. 18. "Demand" goes beyond the notion of economic demand.
Rather, it implies existing social demand for a casino gambling in a given location. SKOLNICK,
supra note 62, at 339.
278. See Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, sched. 2, paras. 3-24. The criteria the licensing authori-
ties are to consider are similar to those which the Board reviews. Id. sched. 2, paras. 18-24.
279. Id. sched. 2, para. 29.
280. Id. sched. 2, para. 29(4). Provisions are also made for appeals by the Board. Id. sched.
2, para. 31.
281. Id. sched. 2, para. 29(4).
282. Id. § 19(2)(a).
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gaming, issuing, receiving or recording cash or tokens, and acting
in any supervisory capacity.2 '
The Board is authorized to inspect gaming premises and ma-
chines "at any reasonable time" and to inspect a licensee's financial
records. 84 Failure to permit such inspection is grounds for revoca-
tion of a license.2 85
Several significant limitations exist which restrict a casino's oper-
ation. Only members of the licensed club or their guests may enter
a club to gamble. 211 Slot machines are limited to two per club.8 7
Advertising is prohibited2 8 and detailed rules are set forth concern-
ing the play of various games.2 9 In addition, no club member is
eligible to take part in any gaming activity unless he has "given
notice in writing, in person on [the club's premises] to the holder
of the license . . . of his intention to take part in gaming on those
premises, and at that time at least forty-eight hours have elapsed
since he gave that notice. 290
These restrictions seem to have been successful in limiting the
overt presence of organized crime and corruption. Criminal activity,
in the form of direct ownership of gambling enterprises or protection
rackets, has been stemmed. 291 The illegal casinos have apparently
disappeared and the growth of legal casinos has been severely lim-
ited. In the mid-1960s under the loose rules and enforcement prac-
tices of the 1963 Betting, Gaming, and Lotteries Act2 192 there were
over 1,200 gaming clubs in England, many of them connected with
organized crime. 293 By 1972, four years after the strict 1968 Gaming
283. Id. §§ 19(2)(b), 19(2)(c), 19(2)(d), 19(3).
284. Id. § 43(2).
285. Id. sched. 2, para. 18.
286. Id. § 12.
287. Id. § 31(2).
288. Id. § 42.
289. Id. sched. 2, para. 25(1). Skolnick reports that this concern for the player went so
far that in the London Playboy Club "the bunnies who deal the games are required to cover
their decolletage with bibs so as not to distract the player's attention from the game itself."
SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 341.
290. Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, § 12(3)(b).
291. Downes, Analysis of a Project on Gambling Activity in England and Wales in
GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, app. 1, at 1005 [hereinafter cited as Downes].
292. Betting, Gaming & Lotteries Act of 1963, c. 2.
293. Downes, supra note 291, at 1009. See also Controlling Casinos, THE ECONOMIST, June
17, 1967, at 1209.
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Act became effective, the number of clubs was reduced to 120.94
The superstructure of control has succeeded to a considerable
extent in protecting the patron and limiting the adverse side effects
of legalized gambling. Because no credit can be extended to gam-
blers, 95 it is difficult for a player to bet over his limit and fall into
dependence on loansharks. The "forty-eight hour" ''9 rule greatly
restricts impulse gambling, as does the two slot machine per casino
limit"' and the general restrictions on the availability of gaming.
Yet gambling is not completely unavailable, so the player is not
forced to find an illegal game if he wishes to gamble. The regressive
nature of gambling is countered to some extent by the nature of the
club system. Because the clubs are private, membership fees and
dress codes that effectively exclude poorer segments of society can
be imposed. In fact, as Skolnick points out in his study of British
gambling, "European governments have traditionally employed
concepts of class segregation in forming casino gaming policy and
294. Downes, supra note 291, at 1009.
295. Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, § 16. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
(I) Subject to the next following subsection, where gaming to which this Part of this
Act applies takes place on premises in respect of which a licence under this Act is for
the time being in force, neither the holder of the licence nor any person acting on his
behalf or under any arrangement with him shall make any loan or otherwise provide
or allow to any person any credit, or release, or discharge on another person's behalf,
the whole or part of any debt,-
(a) for enabling any person to take part in the gaming, or
(b) in respect of any losses incurred by any person in the gaming.
(2) Neither the holder of the licence nor any person acting on his behalf or under
any arrangement with him shall accept a cheque and give in exchange for it cash or
tokens for enabling any person to take part in the gaming unless the following condi-
tions are fulfilled, that is to say-
(a) the cheque is not a post-dated cheque, and
(b) it is exchanged for cash to an amount equal to the amount for which it is
drawn, or is exchanged for tokens at the same rate as would apply if cash, to
the amount for which the cheque is drawn, were given in exchange for them;
but, where those conditions are fulfilled, the giving of cash or tokens in exchange for a
cheque shall not be taken to contravene subsection (I) of this section.
(3) Where the holder of a licence under this Act, or a person acting on behalf of or
under any arrangement with the holder of such a licence, accepts a cheque in exchange
for cash or tokens to be used by a player in gaming to which this Part of this Act
applies, he shall not more than two banking days later cause the cheque to be delivered
to a bank for payment or collection.
296. See note 290 supra and accompanying text.
297. See note 287 supra and accompanying text.
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law."2 ' Social pressure is also employed. A player must have suffi-
cient funds to cover a check written for gambling chips as the check
is legally enforceable. A player who wins cannot redeem a check
written for chips and cannot consolidate a number of checks into
one large one. 29
The imposition of a club system involves little harm to existing
economic interests as proof of existing demand must be shown to
receive a casino license. 00 In England, gambling clubs operate much
as private nightclubs would: play is mostly at night and the clubs
compete for the discretionary funds of a limited segment of the
population.'0 ' The number of clubs is limited so there has not been
a dramatic impact on the entertainment industry.
These desirable results, however, have fostered a system infused
with paternalism and concern for the slightest detail of operation
and the establishment of, what has been called, "the most auto-
cratic British institution since the Star Chamber, '0 2 the British
Gaming Board. 303 No government agency in the United States has
the complete statutory discretion exercised by the British Gaming
Board. As explained above, the Board may decide the number of
clubs in general or the suitability of an applicant to operate a partic-
ular club. Each applicant must obtain a certificate of consent from
the Board before proceeding with the initial investigation by the
Board. If the certificate is denied, the applicant is barred from
proceeding further and there is no right of appeal. The Board need
not defend its conclusions and all Board hearings are conducted in
total secrecy.0 4 It is highly unlikely that a state in this country could
298. SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 338.
299. Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, § 16. These rules are designed to notify the banker that, in
the heat of gambling, a player has written several checks in one evening to the club, indicating
that he has played more than he originally intended. Such information is said to embarrass
a businessman in the financial community. While the clubs dispute the value of this theory,
the British Gambling Board contends that the threat of embarrassment deters businessmen
from writing more than one check per evening to their clubs and thus inhibits impulse
gambling.
300. See note 277 supra and accompanying text. "The licensing authority should normally
allow only one casino to operate, as a monopoly, in each area; this is not a field in which
competition is to be encouraged." THE ECONOMIST, June 17, 1967, at 1212.
301. SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 338.
302. Id. at 340.
303. Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, § 10.
304. See note 281 supra and accompanying text.
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withstand the political controversy surrounding the imposition of
such a system, even if it could overcome the legal challenges to such
uncontrolled discretion. '0'
The National Gambling Commission recommended against the
legalization of casinos. 06 Recognizing, however, the strong pressure
to legalize casino gambling, the Commission recommended that
states choose the English club model rather than the Nevada free
enterprise model. 7 Skolnick disagrees. He concluded that should
states legalize casino gambling, they will do so in response to eco-
nomic pressures. Because the Nevada model is designed to raise
revenue, whereas the club model is designed to correct a social prob-
lem, economic reasons alone preclude the use of the club system in
the United States.30 7 ' It follows that restrictions imposed by the
club model on the number of slot machines, credit, advertising and
casino operation would be impossible in a revenue raising model.
More importantly, the control system inherent in the club model,
namely uncontrolled agency discretion, pervasive paternalism and
governmentally sanctioned discrimination on the basis of class is
antithetical to American values. 3"8 Although many of these factors
could be modified to fit the American system, to do so would inevit-
ably change the system so that the club model would no longer
retain its basic characteristics and would become almost identical
to the tourist-oriented model. It is conceivable that gambling clubs
could be licensed throughout an urban area to meet the perceived
demands of the local population. However, policing such a system
would be prohibitively expensive, especially if there were many
small clubs. If the clubs were large, gambling would be encouraged,
economic forces would push for expansion and the basic reasons for
imposing the club system would be defeated.
305. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
306. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 101.
307. Id. at 103.
307.1. Skolnick's claim is verified by a recent study issued by the New Jersey Department
of Community Affairs. It is reported that the economic strength of the casino industry in
Atlantic City has frustrated the goal to retain the city's image as a family-oriented resort.
State Report Sees Casinos Bringing 'Ominous Clouds' to Atlantic City, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1980, § 1, pt. 2, at 42, col. 3. "The city's economy has already become casino dependent...
and is likely to remain so because casino interests will be able to outbid other economic
interests for available land." Id. at col. 4. Thus, after only three years as a casino resort,
Atlantic City may be unable to contain the growth of casinos.
308. SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 346.
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D. Government Ownership
Direct state ownership of casinos has been suggested as one solu-
tion to the problem of control.309 Gambling invites corruption, in
part, because it can be the source of great profits for the operators.
State ownership of casinos, it is argued, can prevent such corrup-
tion. The excess profits that lead to corruption can be controlled and
any money raised by these predictably lucrative operations will go
directly to the state coffers. Furthermore, if the main reason for
legalizing casinos is to raise revenue, either by diverting cash from
criminal operations or as a purpose in itself, it does not make sense,
the argument goes, to split the profit with outside operators, espe-
cially when the short end of the split goes to the state.310
Various models are possible for government owned casinos in the
United States. One possibility is state ownership and operation di-
rectly through an agency set up for this purpose.31' A second is a
lease contract with private operators running government owned
facilities.31 Other arrangements include combinations of the first
suggestions; for example, allocating ownership, leasing and opera-
tion of various parts of the facility, or even different games, within
a casino. 13 Another model would call for the creation of a public
benefit corporation similar to New York's Off-Track Betting Corpo-
ration314 that would be quasi-governmental yet separate from the
state's legal and financial responsibilities.3 11
309. Governor Favors State Operation Of Any Casino, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1979, at B1,
col. 6; Carey Favors State Casinos But With Private Operators, N.Y. Times, March 13, 1979,
B3, col. 1. The Casino Gambling Study Panel recommended against state-owned casinos. See
note 267 supra.
310. EASY MONEY, supra note 53, at 66.
311. Albany to Get Bid for Wider Gaming, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 7.
312. FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 33.
313. It is reported that Governor Carey of New York wanted a "combination of state
and private operation-possibly having the state rent slot machines to hotels and other
semipublic areas for a share of the returns, for example, while letting private companies
operate casinos in limited areas of the state, under close state supervision." Carey Favors
State Casinos But With Private Operators, N.Y. Times, March 13, 1979, at B3, col. 1. Carey
altered his position in favor of state operated casinos because such a program would require
the hiring of a great many more state employees. Employees of a state owned casino would
be protected by civil service regulations, making it difficult for gaming control officials to fire
someone on mere suspicion of, for example, cheating.
314. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8081-8104 (McKinney 1979).
315. EASY MONEY, supra note 53, at 66.
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The practical problems of state ownership should not be underes-
timated. It is argued that only state ownership and control of all
casino operations could prevent the possible infiltration of organized
crime. There is no guarantee, however, that a state operation would
be free from corruption with organized crime." Moreover, it is hard
to imagine how the state's investigation of potential lessee-operators
could be more rigorous than Nevada's. 17 As noted above, it has been
difficult to keep that system free of scandal and corruption. There
is little reason to believe that state-employed casino operators and
dealers would be any more honest or competent than private em-
ployees. In fact, a state bureaucracy could make it easier for ille-
gal activities to go undetected, or if detected, unreported, for fear
of appearing incompetent to superiors. Any scandal that hits a gov-
ernment owned casino would naturally become a political problem
for state leaders .31 Politicians know that a quasi-government body
may protect the state from legal responsibilities, i but not from
political scandal. It is probably for this reason that the idea of
government ownership has never been widely supported by political
leaders. 310
Competence and honesty are needed not only to prevent corrup-
tion but also to ensure the flow of revenue to the state. The National
Gambling Commission found that casinos are not always the sure
money-makers envisioned by outsiders. Some casinos go bankrupt
and some are only marginally profitable. 32' Of course, the state hav-
ing a monopoly may lessen the risk inherent in the competitive
316. Huey P. Long, while exercising great control over the state machinery in Louisiana
as Governor and later Senator, apparently brought New York racketeer, Frank Costello, and
large numbers of slot machines to New Orleans. Peterson, supra note 59, at 263.
317. See pt. IV(A) supra and accompanying text.
318. See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 102.
319. Hotel Dorset v. Trust for Cultural Resources, 46 N.Y.2d 358, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 413
N.Y.S.2d 357 (1978); Robertson v. Zimmerman, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935).
320. See notes 267-309 supra.
[Nleither Nevada nor England ever really considered government-run casinos, even
though England has nationalized several industries. Nobody has ever elaborated the
reasons, but they are different in England and in Nevada. Since the English see
gambling as an evil to be tolerated, but not encouraged, they could scarcely adopt a
system of state-owned gambling. The Nevadans do not regard gambling as an evil, but
they consider socialism to be one. Moreover, authorities in both systems comprehend
how complex casino gambling is, and how difficult it is to control its honesty.
SKOLNICK, supra note 62, at 344.
321. GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 102.
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system, but government operations tend to run at a deficit.:2 '
Bureaucracies often feel a need to expand as well as to justify and
ensure their continued existence. This can lead to a direct conflict
with the idea of control, especially where the bureaucracy already
has great discretion in defining the limits of the problem. State
owned casinos would appear to present the ultimate test of an
agency's ability to suppress its own self-interests in the name of the
public good. The bureaucracy would be running the operation
rather than trying to control it from the outside. It is improbable
that such an agency would favor a static operation, let alone one of
constantly shrinking size. Add to this the state's interest in a grow-
ing revenue source and possible competition from neighboring states
and it appears inevitable that a state gambling operation would
soon be pressing vigorously for expansion of its province. 12:
Pressure for expansion would bring the state operation into direct
conflict with the control issues of limiting adverse side effects and
preventing undue economic harm to established interests. Quick
expansion would also lead to more problems of discretion, control
of corruption and incompetence because the agency would have to
rush through applications for key casino positions or switch to a
system of at least partial operation by private lessees. As was seen
in the first New Jersey licensing case, the rapid expansion of
revenue-generating casinos does not always lead to the most stud-
ied, controlled agency action."4
The regressive nature of gambling causes a special problem for
state owned casinos. If the state attempted to limit play by impos-
ing barriers to entry similar to those of the tourist-oriented or club
models, equal protection issues would inevitably emerge.325 In ad-
322. New Jersey decided against state owned casinos because "it was felt hotels would
not spend the money to provide first class services expected by tourists if they had no
financial stake in the gambling operation." Variety, March 7, 1979, at 169. The New York
Casino Gambling Study Panel expressed a similar opinion, stating that "[sitate operation
of all casino hotels (a public monopoly) would preclude the essential economic ingredient of
competition to the detriment of the optimum development of the industry." FINAL REPORT,
supra note 51, at 34-35.
323. EASY MONEY, supra note 53, at 77.
324. See notes 248-52 supra and accompanying text.
325. While classifications based on wealth are not inherently suspect, San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), state discrimination based on wealth
would raise controversial equal protection problems.
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dition, state owned or operated casinos would obviously make it
more difficult for authorities to control those forms of gambling still
outlawed. This, in turn, would lead to more arguments in favor of
further relaxing gambling laws and increase support for the expan-
sion of legal gambling operations.
Finally, the issue of state ownership must be examined in the
context of the proper role of the state vis-A-vis its citizens. On the
one hand, state ownership would actively facilitate the choice of
citizens to gamble. On the other hand, it might appear unseemly for
the state to actively promote this choice."' 6 In sum, it is uncertain
whether our image of the American system of government could
withstand the strain placed upon it by the creation of state owned
and operated casinos.
V. Conclusion
It appears that the legalization of casino gambling is inevitable
and that many states will follow the examples of Nevada, New
Jersey and Puerto Rico. States should focus on the purposes to be
obtained through legalization and the means available to control
corruption and limit the adverse side effects of legal gambling.
Any system of control must be built with the present system of
law enforcement and gambling laws in mind. The creation of legal
casinos does not mean that the prohibitions on other forms of gam-
bling should be lifted or relaxed. On the contrary, except for the
legalization of social gambling, enforcement of the present prohibi-
tions should be increased and the penalities stiffened. Illegal gam-
bling should be made "expensive," possibly through the imposition
of mandatory, light jail sentences. The goal is to eliminate police
and prosecutorial discretion and its accompanying corruption with-
out creating new problems.
States must acknowledge that it is unlikely that legalized gam-
bling will render illegal gambling operations unprofitable, nor will
it raise substantial amounts of revenue for the state. Legalized
gambling is expensive to police and causes some injury to the local
citizenry. Control must be rigorous. This leads to problems of
agency discretion. The wide discretion given to control authorities
under existing statutes may give rise to constitutional objections.
326. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
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Unless standards are clear, an agency's power to deny a casino
license to an applicant on the basis of tenuous ties to persons of un-
savory character may conflict with the applicant's rights to due
process and freedom of association. In addition, states that seek to
exclude the poorer segments of the local population from gaining
access to casinos, either directly, as in Puerto Rico, or indirectly,
as in England, risk creating distinctions which violate guarantees to
equal protection under the law. Nevada has rejected these consti-
tutional issues by taking a strong states' rights position with regard
to the control of gambling within the state. As more states legalize
gambling these issues may have to be reexamined. However, vigi-
lant and effective state control of legal gambling may necessitate
the relaxation of constitutional standards and the adoption of
Nevada's states' rights interpretation of gambling control.
Difficult decisions must be made by the state. These include lim-
iting credit, advertising, hours of operation and pay-out odds on the
various games. Casinos should be limited in number and isolated in
location. It is doubtful whether there is any justification great
enough to overcome the danger of putting a casino in an urban
center.
Although circumstances will vary among states, the optimum
model for the control of legal casinos is the tourist-oriented model.
This model permits gambling to be used to revitalize a dilapidated
resort area at little cost to the state. However, more careful control
than New Jersey has exercised must be used in the licensing process.
If a state sets clear, limited objectives and is willing to maintain
rigid control over the growth of its own bureaucracy as well as the
gambling operations, legal casinos can be a boon, especially for a
badly depressed tourist area. However, if the state succumbs to the
dual arguments of easy money and quick control of organized crime,
it will inevitably find itself worse off than when it began, facing an
outcry from the population to outlaw the games. Only when ade-
quate attention has been given to the issues of control can the state
hope to achieve the limited purposes which justify the legalization
of casino gambling.
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